THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS by Jenniges, Derrick T
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Economics Economics
2014
THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-BORDER
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Derrick T. Jenniges
University of Kentucky, jede0501@gmail.com
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses
and Dissertations--Economics by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jenniges, Derrick T., "THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS" (2014). Theses and Dissertations-
-Economics. Paper 15.
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/15
STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been
given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright
permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written permission statement(s) from the
owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic
distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine).
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and royalty-
free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or
hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for
worldwide access unless a preapproved embargo applies. I retain all other ownership rights to the
copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part
of my work. I understand that I am free to register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of
the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we
verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation including all changes required
by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.
Derrick T. Jenniges, Student
Dr. Josh Ederington, Major Professor
Dr. Aaron Yelowitz, Director of Graduate Studies
THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
DISSERTATION 
       
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
College of Business and Economics 
at the University of Kentucky 
 
  
By 
Derrick T. Jenniges 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
 
Director: Dr. Josh Ederington, Professor of Economics 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2014 
 
 
 
Copyright © Derrick T. Jenniges 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays on cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). The first essay studies horizontal and vertical investments between 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, while the 
second essay examines how investment patterns vary by country development. The third 
essay estimates the effect of merger policy reform on cross-border M&A activity in 
Europe. 
 
The first essay tests how well theories of horizontal and vertical foreign direct 
investment (FDI) explain observed patterns of cross-border M&As in OECD countries. 
Horizontal investment occurs when multinational firms produce in foreign countries to 
serve the foreign market, whereas vertical investment occurs when multinational firms 
source intermediate goods from foreign affiliates for final assembly and sales at home. 
The former is often used to displace exports when transport costs exceed local production 
costs, while the latter is often driven by cross-country factor price differentials. Little 
support is found for the traditional explanations of FDI as results indicate horizontal and 
vertical investments look much more similar than previously believed.       
 
The second essay challenges long-standing beliefs that the majority of FDI within 
the developed world is horizontal, whereas investments into developing nations are 
predominantly vertical. Developed-developed FDI is largely cross-border M&As and FDI 
into developing nations typically consists of greenfield investments. However, cross-
border M&As are becoming more popular in developing countries and, contrary to 
previous beliefs, the proportion of horizontal and vertical investment is independent of 
country development. Results suggest trade costs have a stronger effect on developing 
countries, while no clear support is found for the idea that factor endowment drives 
vertical investments in developing nations.  
 
The third essay examines how reforms to European Commission Merger 
Regulation (ECMR) in 2004 affected cross-border M&A activity in Europe. The ECMR 
outlines competition rules and empowers the European Commission (EC) to block anti-
competitive mergers adversely affecting the European market. Details of the reform 
suggest the law was expanded to cover more mergers, which is expected to have a non-
positive effect on merger activity. Difference-in-differences results suggest the reform 
had no significant effect on cross-border merger activity in countries within the EC’s 
jurisdiction.      
 
KEYWORDS: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, multinational firms, horizontal 
foreign direct investment, vertical foreign direct investment, antitrust 
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1 Introduction
At just under $1.4 trillion in 2012, global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows constitute
an important part of worldwide commerce (UNCTAD, 2013). FDI generally comes in the
form of either cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) or greenfield investments.
The former occurs when a domestic firm buys a foreign firm, while the latter happens
when foreign firms build new facilities abroad. A number of patterns have become known
about global investment. First, most FDI concentrates in the developed world. However,
developing country FDI is growing to the point where, in 2012, it actually surpassed
activity in the developed world for the first time ever (UNCTAD, 2013). Second,
cross-border M&As account for the majority of FDI flows. They are more common in the
developed world, whereas greenfield investments are more commonly used to enter
developing countries. However, firms in developing countries are becoming increasingly
active in the M&A market. The three essays comprising the current dissertation study a
number of characteristics regarding worldwide cross-border M&A trends.
The first essay tests how well theories of horizontal and vertical FDI explain observed
patterns of cross-border M&As in Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries. Horizontal investment occurs when multinational firms
locate abroad to produce and sell in the local market, whereas vertical investment occurs
when multinational firms vertically fragment production processes across national
borders. The tariff-jumping explanation of FDI argues horizontal investment will displace
exports when transport costs exceed local production costs. Moreover, the convergence
hypothesis put forward by Markusen and Venables (1996) suggests horizontal FDI flows
will be larger between countries more similar in terms of size, average income, and
relative factor endowments. The comparative advantage theory of vertical FDI, in
contrast, suggests firms look for cheaper factor prices abroad when vertically fragmenting
production (Helpman, 1984).
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Using a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator and standard FDI
determinants found in the literature, I provide one of the only studies empirically testing
whether horizontal and vertical M&As are driven by high trade costs and comparative
advantage, respectively. I identify horizontal and vertical M&As using common methods
in the literature. Separate estimations using horizontal and vertical cross-border M&As as
dependent variables show horizontal and vertical investments look much more similar
than previously believed. Some evidence is found for the comparative advantage theory of
vertical FDI, but evidence for horizontal M&As appears at odds with the tariff-jumping
argument. In general, little support is found for the traditional explanations of FDI.
The second essay challenges long-standing beliefs that the majority of cross-border M&A
activity within the developed world is horizontal, whereas M&As in developing nations
are predominantly vertical. According to the convergence hypothesis, horizontal FDI
should flow between developed countries. Basic comparative advantage theory, however,
suggests vertical FDI should flow from developed to developing countries. Following the
theories, trade costs and factor endowments should have a stronger effect on cross-border
M&As in developing countries, stronger negative effect of trade costs and stronger
positive effect of factor endowments. Researchers typically find cross-country FDI
patterns fit with the theories reasonably well. However, few analyses explicitly test how
well the theories explain current FDI patterns in both developed and developing countries.
The second essay helps fill the void by offering one of the only known studies examining
how the effect of trade costs and factor endowments on FDI varies across countries of
different development. Results based on the typical FDI determinants suggest trade costs
have a stronger effect on developing countries, but no clear support is found for the idea
that factor endowment drives vertical investments in developing nations. Although the
evidence fails to provide unanimous support for any of the tariff-jumping argument, the
convergence hypothesis, or comparative advantage theory, it appears consistent with the
2
finding that the proportion of horizontal and vertical investment is independent of country
development. The results suggest vertical M&As are not driven by comparative
advantage, but rather occur between firms in proximate stages of production.
The third essay examines how antitrust affects cross-border M&As in the European Union
(EU). European Commission Merger Regulation (ECMR) outlines competition rules and
empowers the European Commission (EC) to block anti-competitive mergers adversely
affecting the European market. In 2004, ECMR was reformed to better meet challenges
associated with competition policy and effectively changed to more closely resemble
competition policy in the U.S. One of the most notable changes included in the reform
was scrapping the old dominance test in favor of a new SIEC test. The former was
essentially a two-part test first requiring a concentration (e.g. merger) created a dominant
position before the EC would consider whether the concentration could impede
competition. The new test instead put the focus on whether a concentration would
“significantly impede effective competition." Switching from the dominance test to the
SIEC test seems to have expanded the law to cover more mergers, which is expected to
have a non-positive effect on merger activity. The goal of the third essay is to examine
how ECMR reform affected cross-border M&As flowing into EU countries.
Results from difference-in-difference estimations provide little evidence suggesting
cross-border merger activity increased in countries within the EC’s jurisdiction. Although
the results are robust to a number of different groups of acquiring countries, I am cautious
to interpret the results as direct evidence that the reform had any significant effect on
M&A activity in the EU because M&A activity was very similar outside of the EU.
Furthermore, the difference-in-difference estimator is very simple and fails to account for
a number of other possible events that could have affected M&A activity around the time
of the reform.
3
Together, all three dissertation essays seek to better understand cross-border M&A
patterns around the world. The first two essays seek to understand horizontal and vertical
cross-border M&A location decisions in both developed and developing countries, while
the third essay questions how antitrust policy affects the location of international merger
activity. Cross-border M&As, and FDI more generally, are very important, and there
appears to be no slow down in M&A activity in sight. Thus, the current dissertation
contributes to a growing literature seeking to explain different features of the international
market for corporate control.
Copyright c©Derrick T. Jenniges, 2014
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2 The Determinants of Horizontal and Vertical Cross-border Mergers
2.1 Introduction
Cross-border M&As accounted for the majority of FDI flows over the 1999-2007 period
and have remained an important part of global FDI since.1 For example, with a 2012 value
of 308 billion dollars, cross-border M&A flows were nearly the size of the world’s 33rd
largest economy, Denmark (UNCTAD, 2013).2 The academic literature has taken notice,
and a growing number of papers are studying cross-border M&As. The extant studies,
however, examine aggregate cross-border M&A flows despite a well-recognized
international trade literature that suggests the reasons for expanding production
horizontally or vertically across national borders are not the same. That is, the
determinants of horizontal investments differ from the determinants of vertical
investments. In the current essay, I separate horizontal and vertical cross-border M&As
and test whether the determinants to each type of investment are different as the theory
suggests.
Multinational firms have two main reasons for producing abroad. They set up production
facilities either for local sales of the same products being sold at home (i.e. horizontal
investment) or for purposes of intermediate good production and subsequent shipments
back to the home firm for final sales (i.e. vertical investment). Market access theories
suggest horizontal FDI is used to avoid the trade costs associated with entering new
markets and generally flows between rich countries with similar relative factor
endowments (Markusen and Venables, 1996).3 The comparative advantage theory of
vertical FDI, in contrast, suggests firms look for cheaper factor prices abroad (Helpman,
1See the annual World Investment Reports produced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) (www.unctad.org).
2World ranking of GDP is based off of 2012 World Bank data (www.worldbank.org).
3The substitution of horizontal FDI for exports when trade barriers are large is often referred to as the tariff-
jumping argument.
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1984). Vertical investments typically flow between relatively skilled-labor abundant rich
countries and relatively unskilled-labor abundant developing countries.4 Because vertical
investments are characterized by intra-firm imports of intermediate goods, higher trade
costs are expected to discourage these investments. Thus, the traditional theories suggest
cross-country endowment differences should discourage horizontal and promote vertical
FDI, and trade costs should have a relatively stronger negative effect on vertical than
horizontal FDI.
The empirical literature studying FDI is sizable, but it largely ignores the differences
between horizontal and vertical FDI. The most related literature consists of a group of
papers empirically estimating ideas stemming from the knowledge-capital model.
Developed by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997), the knowledge-capital model
combined the horizontal FDI (e.g. Markusen (1984)) and vertical FDI (e.g. Helpman
(1984)) models into a unified framework. Empirical research based on the
knowledge-capital framework typically uses country-level foreign affiliate sales data, and
evidence for either horizontal or vertical FDI is drawn from different signs and
significance on regression coefficient estimates. For example, a positive and significant
coefficient on a cross-country skill difference variable would be interpreted as evidence
for vertical FDI. Carr et al. (2001) and Davies (2008) provide examples of studies
estimating a knowledge capital framework.
Unfortunately, papers such as Carr et al. (2001) and Davies (2008) are ill-equipped to
make direct comparisons between horizontal and vertical investments. The dependent
variable pools horizontal and vertical FDI and the effect of the variables of interest are not
allowed to vary across the different types of investment. Therefore, interpreting a positive
coefficient on a skill difference variable as evidence for vertical FDI necessitates the
4The theory typically describes forward vertical investments, which occur when firms in rich countries seek
lower unskilled-labor wages in developing countries when sourcing intermediate goods. Backward vertical
investments are also possible, however, because firms in developing countries may seek the skilled-labor
and knowledge capital in rich countries.
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assumption that cross-country skill differences do not drive horizontal FDI. Although
grounded in the theory, one cannot be confident in such a conclusion since no empirical
papers have actually tested whether skill differences have a greater effect on vertical FDI.5
The current essay offers the only study aside from Hijzen et al. (2008) directly comparing
the determinants of horizontal and vertical FDI.6 As I will discuss later, Hijzen et al.
restricted themselves to the differential role of only trade costs on horizontal and
non-horizontal investments, whereas I examine the differential effect of many FDI
determinants across horizontal and vertical investments. I use cross-border M&A data
provided by Thomson Financial Securities (henceforth, Thomson), which improves upon
previously used FDI statistics in both worldwide coverage and level of detail.7 Horizontal
deals are classified using firm-level details (e.g. industry codes identifying location of firm
sales), and these details are matched with industry-level intermediate goods flow data to
identify vertical deals. Classification of each type of investment allows me to create
separate dependent variables for the number of horizontal or vertical M&As, respectively,
between country-industry pairs. I then compare how the determinants differ across
horizontal and vertical M&As by estimating separate models. The obvious variables
thought to differ across deals are trade costs and cross-country factor endowment
differences but, by estimating separate models, I relax the assumption that other variables
have the same effect on horizontal and vertical deals. That is, I compare the effect of all
variables in the model across horizontal and vertical M&As.
Results based on PPML estimation techniques show the determinants of horizontal and
5Another related issue with the literature is the FDI data statistics used. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and
Wynne and Kersting (2008) noted country-level FDI statistics often lack the level of detail necessary to find
many vertical relationships between firms. Thus, it is not surprising that much of the empirical FDI literature
has found better support for horizontal rather than vertical FDI theories.
6Coeurdacier et al. (2009) compared “within sector" M&As to “across sector" M&As, although the authors
admitted both horizontal and vertical deals can occur within the same two-digit Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) sector.
7The literature described above generally uses bilateral U.S. data, whereas Thomson data cover bilateral
investments between many different countries.
7
vertical M&As to look surprisingly similar. My results do not provide clear evidence that
market access matters more for horizontal investments, that comparative advantage
theories matter more for vertical investments, or that many other variables differently
affect horizontal and vertical M&As. In fact, my results suggest distance, as a proxy for
trade costs, deters horizontal M&As more strongly than vertical deals. A stronger effect
on horizontal investments is puzzling for two reasons. First, theory suggests trade costs
should have a stronger effect on vertical FDI. As transportation costs rise, intra-firm
imports (i.e. vertical FDI) become more costly, but local production (i.e. horizontal FDI)
should become more attractive relative to exports. Thus, trade costs should have a strictly
negative effect on vertical investments but a smaller effect on horizontal investments.
Secondly, my results appear to be at odds with Hijzen et al. (2008), who found distance
discourages horizontal M&As less than any other deals. The main difference between the
current essay and their work is I compare the effect of distance across different types of
M&As by constructing separate dependent variables and independently estimating two
separate models. They, however, use an interaction term within a single model to identify
the differential effect of distance on horizontal deals. Specifically, the authors interact the
logarithm of bilateral distance between countries with σ, a variable measuring the percent
of all cross-border M&As that are horizontal. σ, however, is positively correlated with the
dependent variable, which is the total number of bilateral cross-border M&As between a
country-industry pair. The authors estimated a negative effect of distance on total M&As
and a positive coefficient on the interaction term. I show the latter effect, however, results
from the strong positive correlation between σ and the dependent variable. When I control
for the positive correlation, I find the results of Hijzen et al. agree with my results.
My results are robust to a variety of ways to define horizontal and vertical M&As,
empirical specifications, and variables thought to differently affect horizontal and vertical
FDI. For example, I replace distance with a measure of trade integration to provide another
8
proxy for trade costs. According to Bertrand et al. (2007), trade integration should have a
positive effect on all non-horizontal FDI, but the effect on horizontal investments could be
either positive or negative. Regardless, the effect on horizontal M&As is expected to be
different than the effect on other M&As. Similarly, the potential for export-platform FDI,
which consists of horizontal FDI and subsequent exports to proximate markets, is
expected to drive horizontal but not other investments (Blonigen et al., 2007; Baltagi et al.,
2007). Analyses using the measure of trade integration in Bertrand et al. (2007) and the
surrounding market potential variable in Blonigen et al. (2007), however, provide no clear
evidence that horizontal M&As are affected differently than vertical M&As.
Literature has also found contracting institutions to be important in the internalization and,
therefore, vertical FDI decision. At a general level, better institutional environments are
conducive to a variety of cross-border business interactions.8 However, industrial
organization (IO) literature states that a weaker ability to write and enforce contracts,
among other things, makes internalization more attractive (e.g. Williamson (1981)).
Combining the contracting and overall institutional ideas suggests that better contracting
environments are conducive to M&As, but should have an attenuated effect on vertical
deals. Using a number of measures of the contracting environment and overall
institutional conditions, I find little evidence in favor of attenuation. Rather, contracting
institution variables have a similar effect on horizontal M&As.
The recurring finding in the current study is horizontal and vertical M&As look much
more similar than suggested by theory. The most likely explanation is, unlike the extant
empirical literature, I separate horizontal from vertical FDI and individually estimate
empirical models. Separate estimations provide a clear picture on the determinants of
8The positive effect of institutions on cross-border business activity has been shown in the law and finance
literature (e.g. La Porta et al. (1998)), the international trade literature (e.g. Levchenko (2007)), and institu-
tional characteristics have also been shown to be important determinants of capital flows (e.g. Alfaro et al.
(2007)), FDI stocks (e.g. Daude and Stein (2007)) and cross-border M&A flows (e.g. Coeurdacier et al.
(2009)).
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horizontal and vertical M&As because they allow me to directly compare the effect of
each variable across models. My results suggest future empirical work comparing
horizontal and vertical FDI needs to use detailed data and empirical methodologies
allowing for more appropriate comparisons between the different types of investment.
The essay proceeds by first discussing how M&As fit into the alternative options for
expanding horizontally or vertically across national borders. The third section examines
cross-border M&A patterns and describes the specific definitions of horizontal and vertical
deals. Section 2.4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings and empirical specification of
the estimated model. Furthermore, section 2.4 highlights the variables expected to have
differential effects on horizontal and vertical deals. Section 2.5 presents the main results,
and section 2.6 further examines how one of the key results fails to support theory. The
following section addresses different market access motivations for horizontal FDI and
how issues with contracting affect vertical integration decisions. The final section offers
some concluding statements and suggests some areas for future research.
2.2 The Entry Mode Choice
A firm wishing to do business in a foreign market faces a menu of options. Market access
can be achieved by exporting from a national firm, licensing proprietary assets to a foreign
firm that will produce and sell locally, or using direct investment in the local economy.
Exporting, licensing, and direct investment often involve the sale of goods identical or
similar to those being sold in the home market. In contrast, firms may wish to fragment
production vertically to take advantage of cheap intermediate input production options
abroad. A firm can either import inputs via arm’s length transactions with an upstream
supplier or it can engage in intra-firm trade with a foreign affiliate. The latter will
generally be chosen for complex production relationships that are longer term and involve
relationship-specific assets. Whether expanding horizontally or vertically, the optimal
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arrangement will ultimately depend on the relative advantages and disadvantages each
option offers, which are discussed below.
The decision to enter new markets with horizontal production strategies has been studied
by a number of authors.9 The general idea is firms can license a foreign entity to produce
on their behalf, export from a current production facility, or invest directly in the local
economy via a joint venture, greenfield investment, or M&A. Licensing allows a firm to
access foreign markets with minimal resource commitment, thereby mitigating many of
the risks and costs of doing business abroad (e.g. developing local distribution networks,
learning local laws). By licensing a proprietary asset, however, the parent firm exposes
itself to opportunistic behavior on the part of the licensee. For instance, the licensee may
decide to terminate the production relationship and use the proprietary knowledge to set
up a competing firm. The logic broadly follows for joint ventures as well, thereby limiting
the attractiveness of licensing and joint ventures.
Exporting, greenfield investments, and M&As are the other leading horizontal production
options as they offer a greater degree of control over the production process. Exports and
horizontal FDI are typically thought to be competing methods to serve a foreign market.10
The general argument is exporting requires the physical shipment of goods, where the size
of trade costs are increasing in the volume of goods shipped. Higher trade costs increase
prices paid by final consumers and, as a result, discourage exports. In contrast, FDI
requires the fixed costs of either buying or building a production facility. Fixed costs are
avoided with exporting, but FDI avoids the variable tariff and transportation costs
associated with exporting. The logic comprises the tariff-jumping argument, which
suggests higher trade costs may encourage horizontal FDI. I test the tariff-jumping
argument by comparing the effect of trade costs on horizontal and vertical investments.
9See Horstmann and Markusen (1987), Eicher and Kang (2005), and Görg (2000), for example.
10Use of the term FDI henceforth will refer to greenfield investments and cross-border M&As, which I do for
brevity while acknowledging these are not the only direct investment strategies.
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The latter involves intra-firm trade and, therefore, is expected to be discouraged by trade
costs. Section 2.5 proxies trade costs with bilateral distance between countries, and
section 2.7 uses a measure of trade integration. Furthermore, section 2.7 explores the idea
that larger markets surrounding the foreign sales base may create opportunities for
export-platform FDI. More specifically, surrounding market potential should attract
horizontal rather than vertical investments.
Other factors also affect the export-FDI decision for horizontal sales, however. M&As
entail immediate access to things such as local market knowledge, distribution networks,
brand names, reputation, market shares, local resources, and proprietary technologies. The
benefits are typically exclusive to M&As, but some may actually burden the acquiring
firm. For instance, M&As could entail inheriting poor reputations or inferior brand names
from less productive firms, especially when acquisitions serve as an alternative to firm exit
(Bertrand and Zitouna, 2006; Breinlich, 2008). Greenfield investment and exporting, in
contrast, are characterized by their own brand names and reputation. Both forms of entry,
however, are disadvantaged since they have less market knowledge than local firms and
lack distribution networks and market share. Therefore, firms looking to acquire
complementary assets abroad are likely to choose acquisition over exporting or greenfield
investments (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007, 2008).
If choosing horizontal FDI over exports, firms must decide between building a new
production facility or acquiring an existing one. Both require the fixed costs of obtaining a
functioning production facility, but greenfield investments require the resources spent
understanding and adapting to local cultures, languages, standards, and laws. M&As, on
the other hand, require the time and resources used to find a suitable acquisition target and
then integrate corporate cultures or restructure the newly acquired firm. Furthermore,
acquired firms need to be monitored to ensure operations fit within the standards of the
headquarters. Head and Ries (2008) proxied monitoring costs with bilateral distance
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between countries, language barriers, and colonial relationships, all of which are
examined in section 2.4.
In contrast to horizontal production, firms may vertically fragment production to
capitalize on cheaper factor prices abroad. Cross-country factor endowment differences
have the effect of creating differences in factor prices, thereby leading firms to locate the
production of unskilled labor-intensive processes in countries relatively well-endowed
with unskilled labor. Vertical production fragmentation will be attractive if the factor price
differentials are sufficient to offset the added costs of transporting intermediate inputs and,
more generally, doing business abroad. In contrast, firms expanding horizontally will seek
skills similar to those at home since horizontal FDI involves the replication of production
processes abroad. Thus, horizontal investments are likely to flow between countries with
similar factor endowments and factor prices. I test the expected differential effects of
cross-country endowment differences in section 2.4 using skill and education data as
proxies for a country’s skilled-labor abundance.
Firms can procure intermediate inputs by either purchasing in the market or producing
internally within the firm. That is, import intermediate goods from suppliers in arm’s
length transactions or obtain them via intra-firm trade with a foreign affiliate. Both require
costs of physically shipping goods, but using the market also requires the cost of
negotiating things such as product quality and price or delivery details. Specifying quality,
price, or delivery details in a contract can be difficult due to either the complexity of the
production relationship or bounded rationality on the part of the contracting agents
(Williamson, 1981). Thus, internalization is more likely when writing and enforcing
contracts is difficult. I examine the effect on contracting institutions in section 2.7 with
data measuring the contracting environment in a country. Ideas generated by Coase (1937)
also suggest internalization is more likely for repeated, long-term production relationships
whereas infrequent interactions may be well suited for the marketplace. Furthermore, the
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work of Williamson (1981) suggests the attractiveness of internalization is increasing in
the presence of relationship-specific assets due to the potential for hold up. The tradeoff
with internalization, however, is the added costs of buying or building a foreign affiliate.
Thus, a firm seeking to exploit comparative advantages in the form of relative factor
endowments will choose the lower cost option between transacting in the market and
vertical FDI.
In reality, the above-described production arrangements are not perfectly interchangeable.
Firms may use M&As to acquire complementary assets abroad (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007,
2008), while firms looking to expand into some markets via FDI may face objection from
the local government.11 Under the circumstances, exporting may provide the only suitable
way to penetrate a market. However, I proceed with cross-border M&As because they
have been one of the fastest growing forms of international production relationships and
because they are provided within a detailed data set, as I describe next.
2.3 Merger & Acquisition Patterns
Data on cross-border M&As come from the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database
compiled by Thomson, which began in 1985 for international transactions involving at
least a five percent ownership change in a firm. Thomson’s sources include over 200
English and foreign language news sources, SEC filings and their international
counterparts, trade publications, wires, and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law
firms, and other advisors. Thomson data have the advantage of the most expansive
coverage of any other FDI source (Blonigen and Piger, 2012). In line with much of the
literature, I define a merger as a transaction where an acquiring firm obtains a majority
equity position in the target firm via acquiring at least 50 percent ownership or, if already
owning 50 percent or more, acquiring all remaining equity to obtain 100 percent interest
11Japan provides a good example, although the government has lately taken measures to increase inward FDI
(Head and Ries, 2005).
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in the target firm. Distinguishing cross-border from domestic deals is left to Thomson, and
I focus on announced rather than completed dates, although this distinction is not likely to
be important since nearly 100 percent of cross-border M&As announced between
1990-2008 are consummated within the period. Moreover, over 90 percent of all
consummated deals are completed in the same year of announcement.
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in the number of cross-border M&As both worldwide and for
those between countries with OECD membership over the 1990-2008 period. The data
follow patterns consistent with what have been documented by other authors (e.g.
di Giovanni (2005)) as well as the annual World Investment Reports produced by
UNCTAD. Cross-border M&A activity boomed in the late 1990s and then again after the
global economic downturn in the early 2000s. More recent evidence provided by
UNCTAD (2012) has shown, in terms of deal value, cross-border M&A activity has yet to
reach pre-crisis levels despite its upward trend since 2009. In general, the figure illustrates
M&A flows are strongly procyclical and are driven primarily by OECD countries.
In Figure 2.2, I provide the geographic dispersion of acquiring and target firms worldwide.
The data are arranged according to Thomson’s regional classification system:
Africa/Middle East/Central Asia (AF), Americas (AM), Asia-Pacific (excluding Central
Asia) (AP), Europe (EU), Japan (JP), Supranational12 (SN). To no surprise, the majority of
deals involve European or American (especially U.S.) firms. The figure also suggests
M&As concentrate among developed countries, which supports the composition
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In addition to being geographically concentrated, Figure 2.3 shows cross-border M&As
also cluster by industry. I use standard industrial classification (SIC) codes to define sector
groupings in the following manner, with SIC codes in parentheses: Agriculture (1-17),
12Supranational M&As involve firms without a unique nationality.
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Manufacturing (20-39), Transport (40-49), Trade (50-59), Finance (60-67), Services
(70-89).13 The figure shows the manufacturing sector experiences the most M&A activity,
which is appealing for the purposes of the current essay for two reasons.14 First and
foremost, manufacturing firms are at the heart of the horizontal and vertical multinational
enterprise (MNE) models. The early work of Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984)
modeled the practice of multinational firms moving horizontal and vertical, respectively,
stages of manufacturing across national borders. Second, manufacturing output tends to
be tradable, which enables one to compare the role of trade costs between horizontal and
vertical M&As. Both reasons, along with the fact that most M&As involve OECD
countries, provide credence to focus the remainder of the analysis on manufacturing
M&As between countries with OECD membership.
Figure 2.4 shows M&As agglomerate at yet a more disaggregated level. Specifically, the
figure illustrates a large proportion of M&As involve manufacturing firms in the same
two-digit SIC sector, which suggests M&As are common between firms in closely related
industries. Deals within two-digit SIC industries could represent horizontal relationships
whereby firms acquire one of their competitors, or they could entail vertical relationships
through which upstream firms produce highly specialized inputs for downstream
producers. Another possibility, of course, is neither relationship exists and deals serve
merely as a diversifying acquisitions.
In order to empirically compare the determinants of horizontal and vertical investments, I
need to differentiate between horizontal and vertical M&As. In other words, I need to
distinguish between marriages of competing firms and combinations of firms in
buyer-supplier relationships. The literature commonly defines horizontal M&As as deals
between firms in the same industry, while vertical M&As are generally identified by flows
13“Agriculture" includes mining and construction while “Trade" aggregates both wholesale and retail trade.
Public administration is excluded due to the lack of deals in this sector.
14OECD STAN industry GDP data suggests manufacturing M&A activity is quite large for the size of the
industry.
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of intermediate inputs between industries. Gugler et al. (2003) and Hijzen et al. (2008)
defined horizontal mergers as those where the merging parties were located in the same
primary four-digit SIC sector.15 Doing so is both sensible and straightforward, but the use
of only primary SIC sectors treats all firms as single-product firms. In reality, many of the
firms engaging in international M&As are large, multiproduct firms. Identifying
multiproduct firms by the presence of secondary SIC codes in the Thomson data set
reveals 70 percent of all acquirers and 50 percent of all targets do business in multiple
sectors. Hence, treating all firms as single-product may miss many competitive and
buyer-supplier relationships between firms. For example, Procter and Gamble’s 2003
acquisition of Wella, one of the world’s largest cosmetics suppliers based in Germany,
likely eliminated some competitive pressures on its Pantene, Head and Shoulders, and
Herbal Essences hair care brands. Similarly, Procter and Gamble’s acquisition of Long
Chen Paper Co. in 1999 secured a paper mill in Taiwan. Both mergers would be classified
as conglomerate if only using primary SIC sectors, but these acquisitions undoubtedly
have horizontal and vertical repercussions, respectively.
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) accounted for the multiproduct nature of many firms engaging
in FDI by utilizing both primary and secondary SIC codes. Their data set provided up to
six SIC codes (one primary, up to five secondary) for each firm. FDI was labeled
horizontal if parent and subsidiary firms shared any four-digit SIC code. Similarly, vertical
FDI was identified when any sector between parent and subsidiary were deemed buyer
and supplier. Investments having both horizontal and vertical dimensions were identified
as “complex," and were therefore isolated from horizontal and vertical investments.
I follow the method of Alfaro and Charlton (2009) by using primary and secondary
industry codes to identify horizontal and vertical investments. However, omitting
“complex" M&As throws out many deals between large, multiproduct corporations
15That is, firms in the same “primary industry."
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involving interactions along both horizontal and vertical dimensions. For example, the
acquisition of Long Chen Paper Co. by Procter and Gamble eliminated competition in the
tissue and paper towel market in addition to securing a paper mill. Thus, I use the two
methods for identifying horizontal and vertical FDI found in the literature, and I also add a
definition to account for M&As involving both horizontal and vertical interactions. The
three methods used for identifying horizontal and vertical M&As are as follows:
1. primary SIC
2. primary and secondary SIC (without overlap)
3. primary and secondary SIC (with overlap)
M&As are defined as horizontal when four-digit SIC codes between the target and
acquiring firms match. Vertical deals are identified when the target and acquiring firms
reside in different four-digit SIC industries which are marked with sufficient intermediate
goods flow.16 The input-output (I-O) tables provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) are commonly used to measure intermediate goods flow between
industries (e.g. Gugler et al. (2003), Alfaro and Charlton (2009)), and are employed in the
current study as well. The BEA 1992 Benchmark I-O Tables provide the value of goods
flow between industries, and thus the strength of the vertical relationship between sectors.
Specifically, for industries i and j, the Make Table provides i′s value of production of
goods in j. In contrast, the Use Table gives the dollar value of inputs from i required to
produce j′s total output. Using the Make Table, one can calculate the percent of each
dollar of i′s output going to j, aij , by dividing production for j by total production of i.
Analogously for the Use Table, dividing the dollar value of i′s inputs required to produce
j′s total output gives the percent of each dollar of j′s output coming from i, bij . Together,
aij and bij measure the link between upstream and downstream industries. I use
16Of course, intra-firm trade data would be a better way to identify vertical investments, but this data is not
provided by Thomson.
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vij = max{aij, bij} as the final value to classify a merger as vertical. The BEA’s six-digit
industry codes are matched to four-digit SIC codes using BEA concordances. Common
approaches are to define vertical investments where vij is greater or equal to five percent
(e.g. Alfaro and Charlton (2009)) or ten percent (e.g. Gugler et al. (2003)), with larger
values of vij corresponding to more strict definitions of vertical relationships. For
illustration purposes, I present summary statistics using the one, five, and ten percent
thresholds.
Table 2.1 shows the percentages of manufacturing M&As that are horizontal and vertical
over the 1990-2008 period. With the exception of 2008, horizontal and vertical
percentages are given in two-year averages and M&A totals sum over both years. I
include summary statistics using all three definitions. Horizontal deals comprise 38
percent of all M&As if using only primary sectors to define deals (Panel A). Panel B,
however, illustrates many primary SIC horizontal deals have vertical connections in
secondary industries (24.3 < 38.3). If horizontal and vertical are allowed to overlap (Panel
C), then 63.9 percent of M&As are horizontal. Thus, there exists large variation
depending on how one defines horizontal deals. Comparing Panel A to Panels B and C
shows how treating all firms as single-product limits our understanding of the true
relationships existing between merging parties.
There also exists large differences across definitions for vertical M&As, particularly for
definition 3. Just under ten percent of all deals are vertical (10 percent threshold) using
definitions 1 and 2, but over one third are vertical when allowing horizontal and vertical
deals to overlap (Panel C). Similar patterns follow when using one and five percent
thresholds, which are consistent with the findings of others. Using only primary SIC
sectors, Hijzen et al. (2008) found 32 percent of deals to be horizontal over the 1990-2001
period while Gugler et al. (2003) found four percent of deals to be vertical over the
1990-1998 period. I find 38.3 and 9.8 percent, respectively. Furthermore, Alfaro and
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Charlton also found similar patterns between horizontal and vertical investments using
definitions 1 and 2.
2.4 Econometric Methodology and Data
The econometric specification used in the current essay is motivated by the theoretical
framework of Head and Ries (2008). The general idea is bilateral M&As occur as a result
of an endogenous bidding process whereby firms across the globe compete for control
rights on a foreign subsidiary. The probability that a particular firm submits the winning
bid is given by the probability it anticipates a higher target value than do competing
bidders. The authors derive the probability to be an exponential function of the number
and ability of firms at home, the number and ability of competing bidders in other
countries, and physical and cultural distance between home and target countries. In the
end, the expected number of bilateral M&As between a country pair is shown to be a
nonlinear function of both home and foreign market sizes, home firm abilities, bid
competition from third countries, and physical and cultural distance measures.
The model developed by Head and Ries reduced to an estimable equation similar to the
gravity equation, which has become a workhorse in the international trade and FDI
literature. The standard method for estimating gravity equations is by ordinary least
squares (OLS) after log-linearization. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) pointed out two
problems with log-linearization. The first is the existence of zeros in the dependent
variable, which is not uncommon in bilateral trade and FDI data. Thus, taking logarithms
would significantly reduce the sample size by eliminating all zero observations and
therefore any information contained in such data points. The second problem is a
logarithmic transformation of the error will in most cases be a function of the regressors,
leading to heteroscedasticity. Under the circumstances, OLS will fail to be a consistent
estimator. Santos Silva and Tenreyro recommend the PPML estimator as an attractive
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alternative.
In order to successfully employ the PPML estimator for the purposes of the current essay,
however, the modeling framework needs to incorporate the theoretical underpinnings of
horizontal and vertical production relationships. In other words, the model needs to
include both transportation costs and cross-country factor price differentials to test for
differences between horizontal and vertical investments. Furthermore, the econometric
specification should incorporate features of past research that has increased our
understanding of foreign investments. There are two issues with the outstanding empirical
FDI research. The first is, whether studying cross-border M&As or FDI more generally,
the empirical literature is large and typically uses aggregated FDI data.17 The use of
aggregate data, however, makes comparison between horizontal and vertical investments
difficult because horizontal and vertical M&As can only be identified with more detailed
data. The other issue is the number of FDI determinants studied in the extant research is
enormous.18 For example, Blonigen and Piger (2012) pointed out that, among only three
of the more well-regarded empirical FDI studies, there exists 22 different covariates with
very little overlap between studies.
My goal is to examine differences between horizontal and vertical M&As using the
commonly included variables in the empirical FDI literature, which will provide me the
best opportunity to compare my (disaggregated) results to the existing (aggregate) results.
Fortunately, Blonigen and Piger identified the standard variables consistently receiving
strong support to be included in FDI studies. More specifically, they used Bayesian Model
Averaging techniques on the exhaustive set of FDI covariates found in the literature to
pinpoint the variables most likely to explain FDI, which I use as the basis for my
empirical specification. In particular, I use the variables that illustrated inclusion
17Bertrand et al. (2007), Blonigen et al. (2012), and di Giovanni (2005) provide examples of cross-border
M&A studies that used country-level, and therefore aggregate, investment flow data.
18Both Eicher et al. (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2012) noted there exists a surprising lack of consensus
on the appropriate FDI determinants.
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probabilities greater than 50 percent for M&As between OECD countries. With the
theoretical framework of Head and Ries in mind, I incorporate the robust determinants of
M&As into a nonlinear empirical model estimated by PPML as recommended by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro. Denoting the acquiring (target) industry and country as i (j)
and k (l), respectively, the econometric specification is given by:19
E[mijklt,d|covariates] = exp(β0 + β1lnYikt + β2lnYjlt + β3lnDistancekl
+ β4lnRemotekt + β5lnRemotelt + β6lnUrbankt + β7lnUrbanlt
+ β8lnSkillkt + β9lnSkilllt + β10lnD.Skill
2
klt + β11lnD.Education
2
klt
+ β12CommonLanguagekl + β13Colonykl + β14RTAklt + γt + αi + αj) (1)
which will produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest so long as the
conditional expectation of mijklt,d, the number of type d cross-border M&As between
industry i in country k and industry j in country l in time t, is correctly specified
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The type of deal, d, is broken into four categories and,
therefore, four different dependent variables. The first is the total number of deals, which I
denote as “all." “All" M&As aggregates the number of horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate deals into a single dependent variable. The most important dependent
variables for the purposes of the current study are for horizontal and vertical deals. One
variable includes only the number of horizontal M&As, and another includes only the
number of vertical M&As. Separately estimating equation 1 with the horizontal and
vertical dependent variables allows me to compare regression coefficient estimates across
models. I also create a fourth dependent variable comprised of non-horizontal deals to
provide another comparison piece for horizontal deals.
The variables in equation 1 are defined in the following ways, with ln denoting the data
19The inclusion probability of urban concentration of country l was less than 50 percent, but is included
here because, as will be discussed below, agglomeration in host countries has been shown to attract inward
investment.
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are in natural logarithms. Yik and Yjl are production for industries i and j in countries k
and l, respectively, and Distancekl is the bilateral distance between countries k and l.20
Remote represents the remoteness of a country, while Urban measures the urban
concentration of a country. Skill is the skill level of a country, and D.Skill2 and
D.Education2 measure the squared differences in skill levels and average education
levels between countries, respectively. CommonLanguage is a dummy variable denoting
when countries share a common official language, and Colony similarly denotes when
countries share a common colonizer. Having regional trade agreements in place is
represented by RTA. γt are time fixed effects and αi, αj are two-digit SIC sector fixed
effects for industries i and j, respectively, which are included to control for unobserved
variations across time and industries.
I separately estimate equation 1 using different dependent variables to test whether the
determinants to horizontal and vertical M&As are different. The main differences
expected between horizontal and vertical M&As are for distance and the endowment
difference variables. Distance should deter all deals, but the tariff-jumping explanation
argues its effect on horizontal investments should be attenuated or potentially even
positive. In contrast, trade costs should have a purely negative effect on intra-firm trade
and therefore vertical investments. In terms of relative endowment differences,
comparative advantage theories (e.g. Helpman (1984)) claim larger differences are
conducive to vertical investments while the convergence hypothesis suggests more similar
country characteristics lead to larger flows of horizontal investment (Markusen and
Venables, 1996). Thus, the endowment difference variables should have a positive effect
on vertical M&As and a negative effect on horizontal M&As. The effect on “all" M&As
will ultimately depend on the share of deals that are horizontal and vertical.
20Blonigen and Piger (2012) found strong support for real GDP and real per capita GDP at the country
level. Since the current study analyzes M&As at the industry level, I use real value added by two-digit SIC
manufacturing sectors.
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I also allow the effects of the remaining variables to differ across horizontal and vertical
investments. Although the coefficient signs are expected to be the same across models, the
current study offers one of the first papers showing the magnitudes can differ. Higher
income at the country level has consistently been shown to generate more inward and
outward investment, and Hijzen et al. (2008) showed this to be true for larger industries as
well. Hence, bigger industries are expected to promote all types of M&As. The effect of
remoteness on cross-border M&As is not entirely clear. Both the trade and cross-border
M&A literatures offer mixed evidence for remoteness, which can (at least partially) be
attributed to the disparate ways of measuring third-country effects. Researchers generally
agree that remote countries should experience less international activity, however.
Urban concentration and skill levels should positively affect M&A flows. The former has
not been analyzed in previous cross-border M&A studies, but was examined by Blonigen
and Piger (2012) to measure possible agglomeration effects. Agglomeration effects are
tied to theories of economic geography, which posit positive externalities (i.e.
agglomeration effects) induce firms in the same industry to locate proximate to each other
(Head et al., 1995). If agglomeration indeed drives the location of M&A activity, one
should expect urbanization to promote deals. The skill variables, measured as the skill
level of the workforce within a country, should also promote all deals. Tekin-Koru (2012)
found target-country skilled labor to promote FDI, while the MNE literature has shown
parent-country skilled labor promotes FDI (e.g. Markusen (2002)).
Previous research has also found sharing a common official language, sharing a common
colonizer, and having regional trade agreements in place can facilitate cross-border
M&As. Many authors have shown deals to be more common between countries speaking
the same language (e.g. di Giovanni (2005), Berger et al. (2004), Head and Ries (2008)),
while Head and Ries (2008) found colonial variables to be important in promoting
cross-border M&A flows. Similarly, Hijzen et al. (2008), di Giovanni (2005), and
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Coeurdacier et al. (2009) all have shown trade agreements help encourage cross-border
deals. Accordingly, I expect common language, common colonizer, and regional trade
agreement variables to encourage M&A flows. Table 2.2 summarizes the expected effects
of all variables, while Table A1.2 provides data definitions and sources.
Using equation 1 above, the empirical strategy focuses on 19 manufacturing sectors for all
countries with OECD membership.21 I focus on the most recent 10 years of data to obtain
a manageable number of observations. Doing so results in 19 acquiring sectors, 19 target
sectors, 10 years, and 29 acquiring and target countries. The final data set is further
reduced to less than two million observations due to missing data in the regressors.
2.5 Results
I now turn to the estimation results, which are given in Table 2.3. As specified in equation
1, all estimations include both year and acquirer and target industry fixed effects. Robust
standard errors allow for clustering at the country-pair level. I present results using
definition 2 for horizontal and vertical M&As and vij = five percent for vertical M&As,
but it turns out the use of other definitions or vertical thresholds does not meaningfully
change the results.22 For aggregate (“All") M&As, good support is found for the covariate
set as most coefficients are statistically significant with the expected sign. Hence, the
results are consistent with the standard findings in the literature.
Results central to the essay are given in the second and third columns of output, which
provide estimations for horizontal and vertical M&As. I use Wald tests to examine
whether coefficients are equal across models; any statistically different (five percent
significance level) coefficients are denoted by boldface font in the vertical column.
21Table A1.1 provides a list of all two-digit SIC manufacturing sectors. The “furniture and fixtures" (SIC
25) sector is excluded from the analysis due to the lack of production data in the OECD STAN database.
Table A1.3 lists all countries included in the analysis, while Table A1.4 and Table A1.5 provide summary
statistics and the correlation matrix, respectively.
22Results using definitions 1 and 3 are given in Appendix B.
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Overall, the signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance of estimated coefficients
suggest the determinants of horizontal and vertical M&As are very similar. For example,
both horizontal and vertical deals are encouraged by larger industries, higher skill levels,
speaking the same language, and sharing colonial ties. Although some coefficient
estimates across horizontal and vertical deals are different statistically, the differences
seem quite small economically (e.g. βˆ1 = 0.66 and 0.76 for horizontal and vertical M&As,
respectively).
The coefficient estimates on the distance and endowment difference variables between
horizontal and vertical M&As are of particular interest. Distance is found to discourage
both horizontal and vertical deals, but it has a stronger effect on horizontal deals, which
was not expected. Trade costs should have a strictly negative effect on vertical
investments, but the tariff-jumping argument suggests trade costs could have a positive
effect on horizontal investments. At a minimum, trade costs should have a weaker effect
on horizontal than vertical deals. Furthermore, my result runs counter to the main results
of Hijzen et al. (2008), who similarly tested the tariff-jumping argument using
cross-border M&A data. The contradictory findings present a puzzle, which is more
formally addressed in Section 2.6 below. The differential effect of distance on horizontal
and vertical deals, however, is not statistically different. Moreover, coefficient estimates of
0.32 and 0.25 for horizontal and vertical deals, respectively, suggest distance also has an
economically similar effect across deals.
Theory also suggests endowment differences should have different effects on horizontal
and vertical investments. The comparative advantage theory suggests a positive effect on
vertical FDI, while the convergence hypothesis suggests a negative effect on horizontal
FDI. However, I find cross-country skill and education differences promote both vertical
and horizontal deals. The coefficient estimates are very small, but they are statistically
larger for vertical deals. Thus, comparative advantage seems to explain vertical M&As,
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but support for the convergence hypothesis is not evident. The small coefficient estimates
are somewhat surprising given the variation in skill and education levels across countries.
For example, 48 percent of the workforce in the Netherlands is employed in skilled labor
positions whereas only 16 percent are in Mexico. Similarly, the average years of education
attained in Portugal is only seven while the average person receives 13 years of education
in the U.S. One may expect more vertical M&As between U.S. and Portugese firms, but
the results suggest horizontal M&As also flow between these countries.
In general, horizontal and vertical M&As look similar. I use multiple methods to check for
robustness. The first is to compare horizontal to non-horizontal M&As, which is
particularly meant to check whether market access is more important for horizontal
M&As. Non-horizontal M&As are defined as deals where the merging parties do have
sales in the same four-digit SIC industries. The results, given in the last column of Table
2.3, show non-horizontal deals also look similar to horizontal deals. Moreover, the
similarities between deals are robust to alternative definitions of horizontal and vertical
deals. Tables A1.6 and A1.7 present results when using definitions 1 and 3, respectively,
to define deals as described in section 2.3 above. That is, allowing M&As to be
simultaneously defined as horizontal and vertical does not meaningfully change the
results, nor does using only primary SIC codes to define M&As. The results are also
robust to a variety of empirical specifications. For example, using the absolute value of
skill and education differences or including the logarithm of education does not impact the
results. Moreover, in unreported results I show my results are robust to negative binomial
regressions.
The current study provides one of the first papers to separately estimate models in order to
explicitly compare horizontal and vertical investments. My evidence suggests the
determinants of horizontal and vertical investments look much more similar than
previously believed. I do not find clear evidence that tariff-jumping motivations explain
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horizontal M&As, and factor endowment differences have a small but positive effect both
horizontal and vertical M&As. The former result is not consistent with the conclusion of
Hijzen et al. (2008), which is explicated next.
2.6 Distance Puzzle
Hijzen et al. (2008) provide the only other study empirically examining the role of trade
costs on different types of FDI. With interest in testing the tariff-jumping explanation of
horizontal FDI and not on testing the comparative advantage theory of vertical
investments, the authors compared horizontal M&As to all other (non-horizontal) deals.
They found distance to have a less negative effect on horizontal deals, or evidence in favor
of the tariff-jumping argument. In contrast, my results suggest the opposite: distance
deters horizontal investments more strongly than any other. Both papers use Thomson
cross-border M&A data for OECD countries, and horizontal M&As are defined by
primary four-digit SIC codes.23 The goal of the current section is to explain why our
results are not consistent.
The main difference between papers is I separate horizontal and vertical M&As into two
separate dependent variables and estimate two regressions while Hijzen et al. used total
M&As as the dependent variable (d = all) and allowed the effect of trade costs to differ for
horizontal deals with an interaction term.24 In other words, they use a single regression
where a trade cost variable is interacted with σij , which is defined as:
σij =
horizontal M&Asij
total M&Asij
(2)
which is the percent of all deals between industries i and j that are horizontal over the
sample period. Since horizontal M&As are defined at the four-digit SIC level and the
23My results using primary SIC codes to define horizontal and vertical deals are given in Table A1.6.
24They use data over the 1990-2001 period, while I focus on the 1999-2008 time frame. They also used
two-year averages while I focus on annual data.
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empirical analysis focuses on the two-digit SIC level, σij ranges from zero to one for
observations within the same two-digit sector and equals zero for observations crossing
two-digit sectors. In reference to Figure 2.4, σij ∈ [0, 1] on the diagonal but will always
equal zero off the diagonal. The authors allowed the effect of distance to vary across
horizontal and non-horizontal deals through the use of:
α1lnDistancekl + α2σijlnDistancekl (3)
in their empirical specification, where the dependent variable is the total number of
cross-border M&As between a country-industry pair.25 According to the tariff-jumping
argument, αˆ1 < 0 and αˆ2 > 0 should be the case, which is exactly what the authors found.
Moreover, equation 3 shows one can calculate the value of σij necessary to induce a
positive effect of distance.26 Depending on the specification, the authors showed the
threshold can be as small as 63.7 percent. Therefore, distance deters M&As when
horizontal deals make up a sufficiently small share of total deals (< 63.7 percent) but has a
positive effect if horizontal M&As comprise a larger share of all deals (> 63.7 percent).
However, by using only horizontal M&As as the dependent variable, my results in section
2.5 show the effect of distance is negative even if 100 percent of M&As are horizontal.
I begin by incorporating (3) into equation 1 in an attempt to replicate the main result of
25The total number of deals is comprised of horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate deals.
26αˆ1 + αˆ2σij > 0 or σij > −αˆ1/αˆ2.
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Hijzen et al.. The resulting specification is given by:
E[mijklt,all|covariates] = exp(β0 + β1lnYikt + β2lnYjlt + β3lnDistancekl
+ β4σijlnDistancekl + β5lnRemotekt + β6lnRemotelt + β7lnUrbankt
+ β8lnUrbanlt + β9lnSkillkt + β10lnSkilllt + β11lnD.Skill
2
klt
+ β12lnD.Education
2
klt + β13CommonLanguagekl + β14Colonykl
+ β15RTAklt + γt + αi + αj) (4)
where the dependent variable in equation 4 corresponds to d = “all" in equation 1.27 Table
2.4 provides the estimation results.28 Column 1 is labeled “Hijzen et al. (2008)" as it
mirrors the authors’ use of the interaction term. Results corroborate those of Hijzen et al.:
although distance discourages M&As in aggregate, its effect weakens the higher the share
of horizontal M&As. In fact, if the share of horizontal M&As exceeds 68 percent
(σij > 0.496/0.730), then distance actually encourages deals. Notice also the original
signs and significance on all other variables are unaffected by the inclusion of the
interaction term.
Figure 2.4 illustrates a large proportion of M&As occur within the same two-digit SIC
industries which, by definition, is also where all of the horizontal deals happen. Moreover,
σij = 0 anywhere off the diagonal by definition. Hence, σij is positively correlated with
the dependent variable, which is confirmed in the data.29 Thus, it is an open question
whether the estimate for β4 reflects the differential effect of distance on horizontal M&As
or if it is instead picking up the vast M&A activity within two-digit SIC sectors. I include
σij as a separate regressor to test, and column 2 confirms. The estimate for β4 falls to zero,
27Since I am using primary SIC industries to define horizontal M&As here to match the methods of Hijzen
et al., the results obtained using equation 4 will be comparable to the left-most column of output in Table
A1.6.
28I present results using PPML estimations to be consistent with section 2.5. Hijzen et al. used negative
binomial regressions, but my results are robust to this estimation procedure as well.
29The correlation coefficient = 0.1045.
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and the large coefficient on σij reflects the sizable M&A activity along the diagonal of
Figure 2.4.
Columns 3 and 4 serve as robustness checks. In column 3, I repeat the Hijzen et al. (2008)
specification after replacing σij with Dij , a dummy variable taking a value of one when
i = j and zero otherwise. The results are similar to those when using σij , but the
coefficient on the interaction term between σij and the logarithm of distance is negative
and significant when using Dij . That is, the effect of distance on horizontal deals is also
negative, and it becomes more negative the larger is the share of horizontal deals. Thus,
the results using Dij suggest σij acts as a dummy variable denoting when M&As take
place in the same two-digit industry. Another way to show σij acts like a dummy variable
is by including industry-pair fixed effects, which will control for M&As in the same
two-digit sectors. As shown in column 4, the results are similar to those in column 2.
Distance has a negative effect on all deals, but the estimate for β4 is statistically zero.
In general, the results in Table 2.4 cast doubt on the finding that distance encourages
horizontal cross-border M&As. Rather, the positive coefficient estimated on
σijlnDistancekl is due to strong positive correlation between σij and the dependent
variable. Once one controls for the positive correlation (i.e. the fact that most M&As
occur within two-digit SIC sectors), distance no longer has a positive effect on horizontal
investments. In other words, results presented in columns 2-4 of Table 2.4 agree with
those presented in Table 2.3: the effect of distance is not weaker for horizontal
investments. Hence, properly controlling for the large intra-industry M&A activity shows
the results of Hijzen et al. (2008) agree with my results. Distance has a strictly negative
effect on all types of deals, and there exists evidence it may be stronger for horizontal
cross-border M&As.
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2.7 Extension: Market Access and Contracting Institutions
The tariff-jumping and comparative advantage theories are two well-recognized
explanations of cross-border investment. Yet they are not the only theories describing
international production patterns. As discussed in section 2.2, the FDI literature has shown
horizontal investments are driven by another form of market access: export-platform FDI.
Export-platform investment occurs when horizontal investments are used to serve not only
the local market, but nearby countries through exports as well. In contrast, theories of the
firm in the IO literature have shown the firm’s choice between outsourcing and
internalizing the production of intermediate inputs depends critically on the ability to
write and enforce contracts. Market transactions are attractive when details of a contract
are easily specified and enforced, but vertical FDI is more attractive when the contracting
environment is poor. The current section tests whether export-platform opportunities drive
horizontal M&As and contracting environments affect the location of vertical M&As. I
also follow the literature and test whether trade integration explains horizontal deals.
2.7.1 Market Access
Market access is a term often used to describe reasons for expanding production
horizontally across national borders. Whether it comes in the form of entering new
markets or simply maintaining sales in an existing market by replacing exports with local
production, horizontal FDI involves the sale of products similar to those being sold at
home. The tariff-jumping idea suggests trade costs encourage horizontal FDI to distant
countries, whereas exports can be optimal between more proximate countries. In section
2.5, I surprisingly found distance had the largest effect on horizontal M&As. I revisit the
puzzling result using a measure of trade integration, which more explicitly controls for the
amount of bilateral trade flowing between countries.
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Following Bertrand et al. (2007), market access can be approximated by a measure of
trade integration given by:
φkl =
√
ψklψlk
ψkkψll
where ψkl represents the value of country k′s imports from country l and ψkk is local sales
of country k.30 Data were obtained from the OECD STAN database (ISIC Rev. 3) and
subsequently converted to U.S. dollars using the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
International Financial Statistics (IFS) exchange rate data (period average). φkl lies
between zero and one, with values closer to one indicating more integrated markets. When
considering horizontal M&As, φkl has two opposing effects. The tariff-jumping argument
suggests better market integration (larger φkl) reduces the incentives to merge because
trade costs are not large enough to make horizontal FDI more attractive than exporting. In
contrast, more integrated markets could mean more competition, which could spur M&As
in order for firms to capture some price-setting power. Hence, the overall effect on
horizontal investments will be determined by which individual effect dominates.
According to Bertrand et al., φkl should have a strictly positive effect on all non-horizontal
deals.
Export-platform FDI, which consists of horizontal FDI and subsequent exports to
proximate markets, should also have a different effect on the location of horizontal
investments.31 Specifically, locations well-suited for export-platform FDI should attract
horizontal FDI and not vertical investments. Following Blonigen et al. (2007), I measure
surrounding market potential by the sizes of markets near a potential target firm. Market
potential is represented by the sum of inverse-distance weighted GDPs of all k 6= l
30Local sales are calculated by netting exports out of total production.
31See Blonigen et al. (2007) and Baltagi et al. (2007) for recent articles on export-platform FDI.
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countries in the world, and is formally given by:
Potentiall =
∑
k 6=l
Yk
Distancekl
Real GDP data (Yk) are taken from Penn World Tables while, as before, the distance data
are obtained from CEPII.32 Theory maintains Potentiall should encourage
export-platform (i.e. horizontal) FDI while having no effect on other types of investments.
Table 2.5 provides the estimation results for both trade integration and surrounding market
potential. The specification follows equation 1 but individually appends lnφkl and
lnPotentiall. For brevity, I only report the results for the variables of interest. The effect
of lnφkl and lnPotentiall should be smaller and larger, respectively, for horizontal M&As
compared with all other deals. However, I find the effects to be both statistically and
economically similar between different types of deals. The positive effect of trade
integration mirrors the result found by Bertrand et al., and the negative effect of market
potential, although not expected, is consistent with the finding of Blonigen et al..33 The
former suggests trade and cross-border M&As are complementary, while the latter
suggests the M&A market is competitive, with fewer firms being acquired when nearby
substitutes are plentiful. The latter result follows the idea that higher bid competition can
reduce M&A activity in a given country (Head and Ries, 2008).
2.7.2 Contracting Institutions
Just as market access motivations are thought to be important for horizontal investments,
issues with writing and enforcing contracts are very important in the firm’s internalization,
and thus vertical FDI, decision. As discussed in section 2.2, firms have two general
options when looking to source intermediate inputs. They can either acquire inputs
32GDP data are in trillions of 2005 international dollars.
33Blonigen et al. suggested border effects may be the cause of the negative coefficient.
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through arm’s length transactions in the market where the details of the relationship are
outlined in a contract, or they can internalize input production within the boundaries of the
firm. Higher transactions costs of market interactions, contract complexity, and bounded
rationality all increase the attractiveness of internationalization over contracting. Thus, a
firm comparing the two options between two different countries should prefer to
internalize suppliers in the country with relatively worse contracting institutions while
outsourcing input production in the country with better institutions.
More general institutional characteristics, however, will affect the decision to do business
in foreign countries in the first place. For example, institutional environments have been
shown to be important in the law and finance literature (e.g. La Porta et al. (1998)), the
international trade literature (e.g. Levchenko (2007)), and they have also been shown to be
important determinants of capital flows (e.g. Alfaro et al. (2007)), FDI stocks (e.g. Daude
and Stein (2007)) and cross-border M&A flows (e.g. Coeurdacier et al. (2009)). Findings
indicate better institutional characteristics promote cross-border transactions, whatever
form they take. Combining the results for overall institutional characteristics with the IO
theories suggests cross-border M&A activity should be higher in countries with stronger
institutions, but their effect on vertical M&As should be attenuated because a better
contracting environment reduces the relative attractiveness of vertical FDI over
contracting.
I examine the idea that contracting institutions will affect vertical M&As differently than
other M&As using multiple proxies for institutions, all attempting to measure a country’s
contracting environment. The first data set I utilize is the World Bank’s Doing Business
Report, which collects data for 185 countries on the capacity to resolve a commercial
lawsuit. I take two variables from the report. The first is the number of days required to
enforce a contract (Days), while the second is the cost (percent of claim) of enforcing a
contract (Cost). Larger values of both variables translate into less efficient contracting
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environments. Hence, contracting institutions variables are expected to have a negative
effect on M&As, with an attenuated effect on vertical deals. Moreover, only the
contracting institutions of the target country should matter because that is where the
contract need be enforced.
I also use two legal environment variables to measure the strength of contract enforcement
in a country. The first is a rule of law index taken from the World Governance Indicators.
Denoted Rule, this variable takes on a value ranging from -0.25 to 0.25, with larger index
values corresponding to better rule of law. In addition, an index of the strength of legal
rights (Legal) is taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Legal ranges
from zero to 10, with higher scores indicating bankruptcy and collateral laws are better
designed to facilitate the flow of credit in an economy. Both indexes of the legal
environment are expected to promote M&As but, as noted above, the effects should be
attenuated for vertical deals. Moreover, they should matter for both outward and inward
investment because better institutions facilitate overall business activity. Table 2.6
formally provides the hypothesized effect of each variable.
Table 2.7 provides the estimation results using equation 1 appended individually by each
measure of institutions. For presentation purposes, I report only the variables of interest.
Real GDP per capita variables are included in each estimation to avoid the possibility that
institutions proxy for average income.34
The signs and significance largely fit with expectations, but I once again find very little
differences between horizontal and vertical investments. As expected, the variables
measuring contract enforcement are more important in the target country, and Daysl and
Costl show some evidence of attenuation for vertical deals. For the overall legal
environment better institutions are found to promote deals, in particular for the strength of
34Real GDP per capita data are in 2005 international dollars and were taken from Penn World Tables.
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legal rights. Both Legal and Rule provide evidence of attenuation, but only in the target
country. In general, Table 2.7 shows some evidence of attenuation in the target country,
but the degree of difference between horizontal vertical M&As is neither statistically nor
economically large.
The results follow the general theme of the essay that the determinants of vertical and
horizontal look similar. Market access affects vertical as well as horizontal investments,
and contracting institutions drive the location of both types of deals. The results are robust
to a number of proxies for market access and contracting institutions.
2.8 Conclusion
Theory suggests market access should drive horizontal FDI, while cross-country factor
endowment differences should facilitate vertical FDI. The empirical FDI literature
studying the different types of investment largely fails to appropriately distinguish
between the determinants of horizontal FDI and the determinants of vertical FDI. The
current essay provides one of the first studies explicitly comparing the determinants of
FDI across horizontal and vertical investments.
I use a detailed database on cross-border M&As to compare the determinants of horizontal
and vertical investments in OECD countries over the 1999-2008 period. Importantly, the
database improves upon FDI data used in prior empirical studies by offering firm-level
details, information that allows me to identify horizontal and vertical M&As. I separate
horizontal and vertical M&As into two separate dependent variables and estimate two
regressions using the standard regressors found in the literature. I then compare the effect
of each regressor across horizontal and vertical models.
I find the determinants of horizontal and vertical M&As to look very similar, both
statistically and economically. That is, I do not find market access matters more for
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horizontal than vertical investments. In fact, my results suggest distance deters horizontal
M&As more strongly than vertical deals. Furthermore, I find only weak evidence that
cross-country endowment differences matter more for vertical investments than horizontal
investments. Thus, I show the determinants of horizontal and vertical M&As look more
similar than the theory and past empirical research suggest. The results are robust to a
variety of M&A definitions, empirical specifications, and additional variables thought to
differently affect horizontal and vertical deals.
The evidence presented in the current study suggests the identification of horizontal and
vertical FDI requires more detailed information than many country-level data sets offer.
Future comparisons between the different types of investment need to use very detailed
data to accurately discern between horizontal and vertical investments. Admittedly, the
level of detail necessary to separately identify horizontal and vertical FDI is very
demanding of any data set. Future research is needed to better understand why distance
deters horizontal investments more strongly than vertical investments, and more generally
why horizontal and vertical FDI look so similar.
Copyright c©Derrick T. Jenniges, 2014
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2.9 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Cross-border M&A activity
Figure 2.2: Cross-border M&A activity by region
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Figure 2.3: Cross-border M&A activity by sector
Figure 2.4: Cross-border M&A activity by manufacturing sector, OECD countries
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Table 2.1: Composition of horizontal and vertical M&As
Horizontal Vertical (1%) Vertical (5%) Vertical (10%) Total
Panel A: Primary SIC
1990-1991 35.2 28.9 14.8 11.5 1,860
1992-1993 37.8 28.1 14.9 10.5 1,599
1994-1995 33.3 28.6 14.4 10.2 1,948
1996-1997 37.3 26.8 13.3 9.9 2,416
1998-1999 35.6 29.1 15.2 10.7 3,037
2000-2001 36.5 28.6 14.2 9.2 2,742
2002-2003 39.9 26.7 11.8 8.9 1,861
2004-2005 41.8 25.5 13.4 10.7 2,110
2006-2007 43.0 24.5 11.6 8.1 2,629
2008 44.9 24.4 12.6 9.1 1,244
Total 38.3 27.2 13.7 9.8 21,446
Panel B: Primary and secondary SIC (without overlap)
1990-1991 26.9 29.1 19.6 9.9 1,860
1992-1993 29.1 28.8 18.3 9.3 1,599
1994-1995 23.8 30.8 19.4 10.0 1,948
1996-1997 26.5 28.4 18.2 9.2 2,416
1998-1999 25.2 28.0 17.8 9.4 3,037
2000-2001 25.8 26.9 17.6 9.3 2,742
2002-2003 24.6 25.6 16.8 8.6 1,861
2004-2005 21.0 24.8 16.9 8.5 2,110
2006-2007 19.8 24.5 17.1 7.8 2,629
2008 20.2 21.9 16.7 7.6 1,244
Total 24.3 27.0 17.8 9.0 21,446
Panel C: Primary and secondary SIC (with overlap)
1990-1991 60.0 73.1 52.7 32.5 1,860
1992-1993 59.5 68.8 48.7 29.3 1,599
1994-1995 55.9 72.0 51.5 30.5 1,948
1996-1997 59.6 71.7 51.3 30.1 2,416
1998-1999 61.5 73.5 54.1 31.6 3,037
2000-2001 64.1 76.6 55.9 33.0 2,742
2002-2003 66.5 78.8 58.8 35.5 1,861
2004-2005 69.2 84.1 65.1 42.1 2,110
2006-2007 70.8 85.8 68.1 41.2 2,629
2008 73.4 85.8 69.9 43.0 1,244
Total 63.9 76.9 57.4 34.6 21,446
Horizontal and vertical M&As do not sum to one due to the presence of conglomerate deals.
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Table 2.2: Expected effects of variables
All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
Yik + + +
Yjl + + +
Distancekl – +/– –
Remotek – – –
Remotel – – –
Urbank + + +
Urbanl + + +
Skillk + + +
Skilll + + +
D.Skill2kl +/– – +
D.Education2kl +/– – +
CommonLanguagekl + + +
Colonykl + + +
RTAkl + + +
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Table 2.3: PPML estimation results (primary and secondary SIC – without overlap)
All M&As Horizontal Vertical Non-horizontal
lnYik 0.719*** 0.662*** 0.763*** 0.737***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.043) (0.034)
lnYjl 0.686*** 0.582*** 0.720*** 0.717***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.047) (0.035)
lnDistancekl -0.255*** -0.316*** -0.249*** -0.236***
(0.073) (0.098) (0.094) (0.074)
lnRemotek 1.926*** 1.411* 2.302*** 2.079***
(0.552) (0.734) (0.686) (0.533)
lnRemotel 1.074 0.554 2.086*** 1.223*
(0.704) (0.989) (0.747) (0.662)
lnUrbank 0.481 -0.152 0.490 0.673
(0.404) (0.513) (0.587) (0.414)
lnUrbanl 0.998** 0.850 0.636 1.053**
(0.432) (0.538) (0.547) (0.440)
lnSkillk 2.751*** 2.373*** 3.050*** 2.871***
(0.340) (0.364) (0.413) (0.367)
lnSkilll 1.874*** 1.146** 2.766*** 2.081***
(0.325) (0.473) (0.376) (0.309)
lnD.Skill2kl 0.055*** 0.006 0.082*** 0.068***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.027) (0.020)
lnD.Education2kl 0.066*** 0.060** 0.143*** 0.068***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.035) (0.021)
CommonLanguagekl 0.561*** 0.701*** 0.516*** 0.520***
(0.121) (0.143) (0.140) (0.120)
Colonykl 0.520*** 0.516*** 0.513*** 0.515***
(0.166) (0.197) (0.180) (0.168)
RTAkl 0.225 -0.204 0.091 0.241
(0.151) (0.200) (0.204) (0.157)
Constant -58.737*** -48.250*** -72.435*** -62.590***
(8.136) (11.345) (9.070) (7.684)
Log-pseudolikelihood -26,533.6 -7,318.1 -6,087.0 -21,599.0
Observations 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240
Estimations include both acquirer and target industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC level) as well as time
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are
denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively. Bold coefficients
in the vertical and non-horizontal columns denote the coefficients are statistically different (five percent
significance level) from the corresponding coefficients in the horizontal column.
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Table 2.4: PPML estimation results (primary SIC)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hijzen et al.
(2008)
All M&As All M&As All M&As
lnYik 0.727*** 0.724*** 0.724*** 0.727***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024)
lnYjl 0.693*** 0.691*** 0.692*** 0.694***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025)
lnDistancekl -0.496*** -0.235*** -0.184*** -0.223***
(0.082) (0.078) (0.076) (0.053)
σij lnDistance
†
kl 0.730*** -0.050 -0.177*** -0.075
(0.025) (0.050) (0.046) (0.112)
σij 5.950***
(0.374)
Dij 4.009***
(0.206)
lnRemotek 1.985*** 1.907*** 1.901*** 1.932***
(0.566) (0.553) (0.557) (0.623)
lnRemotel 1.118 1.070 1.070 1.099*
(0.723) (0.701) (0.702) (0.580)
lnUrbank 0.436 0.466 0.466 0.468
(0.411) (0.408) (0.409) (0.320)
lnUrbanl 0.951** 0.984** 0.984** 0.983***
(0.434) (0.431) (0.433) (0.270)
lnSkillk 2.828*** 2.766*** 2.766*** 2.782***
(0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.316)
ln Skilll 1.952*** 1.896*** 1.899*** 1.915***
(0.334) (0.326) (0.327) (0.318)
lnD.Skill2kl 0.053** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
lnD.Education2kl 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012)
CommonLanguagekl 0.553*** 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.547***
(0.121) (0.119) (0.119) (0.061)
Colonykl 0.544*** 0.543*** 0.548*** 0.550***
(0.167) (0.169) (0.170) (0.101)
RTAkl 0.286* 0.207 0.212 0.217***
(0.154) (0.152) (0.152) (0.082)
Constant -58.454*** -59.407*** -58.601***
(8.547) (8.220) (8.277)
Acquirer industry effects Yes Yes Yes No
Target industry effects Yes Yes Yes No
Industry-pair effects No No No Yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -20,895.9 -20,673.6 -20,477.9 -19,000.1
Observations 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240 823,874
All estimations include time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses
for columns 1-3, while the standard errors are clustered by industry pairs for column 4. Significant
coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
† In column 3, the result is robust to the use of Dij lnDistancekl in place of σij lnDistancekl.
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Table 2.5: PPML estimation results: market access (primary and secondary SIC – without
overlap)
All M&As Horizontal Vertical Non-horizontal
Panel A:
lnφkl 0.522*** 0.545*** 0.643*** 0.512***
(0.060) (0.077) (0.088) (0.062)
Log-pseudolikelihood -24,722.0 -6,860.6 -5,589.9 -20,104.6
Observations 1,283,248 1,283,248 1,283,248 1,283,248
Panel B:
lnPotentiall -0.513*** -0.442*** -0.571*** -0.527***
(0.125) (0.149) (0.156) (0.128)
Log-pseudolikelihood -26,453.6 -7,304.6 -6,075.7 -21,535.2
Observations 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240
Estimations include both acquirer and target industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC level) as well as time
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are
denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively. Bold coefficients
in the vertical and non-horizontal columns denote the coefficients are statistically different (five percent
significance level) from the corresponding coefficients in the horizontal column. Panel A omits distance
because of high correlation between distance and φkl (-0.6458), and target remoteness is removed in Panel
B because it is highly correlated with surrounding market potential (-0.7836). The signs and significance
of other variables follow the previous analysis with few exceptions.
Table 2.6: Expected effects of variables: contracting
institutions
All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
Daysk 0 0 0
Daysl – – +/–
Costk 0 0 0
Costl – – +/–
Rulek + + +/–
Rulel + + +/–
Legalk + + +/–
Legall + + +/–
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Table 2.7: PPML estimation results: contracting institutions (primary and secondary SIC
– without overlap)
All M&As Horizontal Vertical Non-horizontal
Panel A:
lnDaysk -0.125 0.058 -0.544*** -0.162
(0.119) (0.212) (0.170) (0.117)
lnDaysl -0.329*** -0.380** -0.189 -0.315***
(0.117) (0.150) (0.167) (0.120)
Log-pseudolikelihood -17,482.1 -4,479.5 -3,918.1 -14,502.8
Observations 867,256 867,256 867,256 867,256
Panel B:
lnCostk 0.048 -0.061 -0.121 0.079
(0.141) (0.210) (0.196) (0.145)
lnCostl -0.295** -0.276* -0.225 -0.298**
(0.119) (0.161) (0.187) (0.123)
Log-pseudolikelihood -17,486.6 -4,481.8 -3,923.1 -14,505.6
Observations 867,256 867,256 867,256 867,256
Panel C:
Legalk 0.060** 0.041 0.113*** 0.065***
(0.024) (0.042) (0.034) (0.023)
Legall 0.081*** 0.116*** 0.050 0.073***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.041) (0.025)
Log-pseudolikelihood -15,022.5 -3,723.2 -3,409.7 -12,560.8
Observations 728,820 728,820 728,820 728,820
Panel D:
Rulek 0.297** 0.029 0.627*** 0.369**
(0.146) (0.219) (0.191) (0.145)
Rulel 0.023 0.247 -0.076 -0.029
(0.131) (0.157) (0.199) (0.136)
Log-pseudolikelihood -21,942.3 -5,809.7 -5,012.9 -18,063.1
Observations 1,119,248 1,119,248 1,119,248 1,119,248
Estimations include both acquirer and target industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC level) as well as time
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are
denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively. Bold coefficients
in the vertical and non-horizontal columns denote the coefficients are statistically different (five percent
significance level) from the corresponding coefficients in the horizontal column. All estimations include
per capita GDP of the acquiring and target countries to avoid the possibility that institutions could proxy
for wealth. The signs and significance of other variables follow the previous analysis with few exceptions.
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3 The Determinants of Cross-border Mergers by Country Development
3.1 Introduction
At just under $1.4 trillion in 2012, global FDI flows remain an important piece of
worldwide market activity (UNCTAD, 2013). Most FDI concentrates in the developed
world and, from the late 1990s up until the recent global financial crisis, the majority takes
the form of cross-border M&As (UNCTAD, 2012). Although cross-border M&As are
prevalent in developed countries, FDI flows in developing nations are more commonly
greenfield investments. Two recent trends in FDI flows, however, are of particular interest.
First, the proportion of FDI flowing in developing countries has risen over time. For the
first time ever, developing country FDI surpassed activity in the developed world in 2012
(UNCTAD, 2013). Second, cross-border M&A activity in developing countries has also
risen over time. The current essay provides one of the only known analyses studying such
trends and examining differences between M&As in developed and developing countries.
Widely held beliefs are that most FDI within the developed world is horizontal, whereas
investments from developed countries into developing nations are largely vertical. The
former occurs when firms produce and sell the same products in overseas markets as at
home. The convergence hypothesis put forward by Markusen and Venables (1996)
suggests horizontal FDI flows will be larger between countries more similar in terms of
size, average income, and relative factor endowments. Furthermore, the tariff-jumping
explanation of horizontal FDI suggests higher trade costs may have a positive effect on
investment since horizontal investment and exports can be substituted for each other.
Thus, horizontal FDI flows are expected to be largest between very similar countries
separated by relatively large trade costs.
A firm’s decision to fragment production vertically across national borders, however, is
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quite different. One of the main reasons for moving intermediate good production abroad
is to take advantage of cheaper production processes, usually with
unskilled-labor-intensive stages of production. The latter occurs because developing
nations tend to have less-skilled workforces, which results in lower unskilled-labor wages.
Hence, following basic comparative advantage theory, production processes requiring
skilled labor will tend to be located at home, whereas unskilled-labor-intensive processes
will tend to be located in developing countries. In addition, the costs associated with
intra-firm trade make proximity another important decision variable when considering
vertical FDI. Thus, vertical FDI flows should be largest between country pairs
characterized by relatively small trade costs and large differences in factor endowments.
The current essay tests how well the above-described ideas explain cross-border M&A
patterns across developed and developing countries. More specifically, it examines
whether factor endowments and trade costs have a larger impact on developing countries,
as suggested by theory. Using the standard FDI determinants, I compare bilateral
cross-border M&A flows by location of target firms. Results suggest trade costs have a
larger impact when targets are located in developing countries. For example, bilateral
distance has a negative effect on M&A activity, but its effect is much stronger for targets
located in developing countries. Moreover, the effect of distance is strongest for
horizontal deals which, although consistent with the findings of Chapter 2, was not
expected. A number of other trade cost variables have a differential effect by country
development. The effect of speaking the same language is largest for developing targets,
and results also suggest the positive effect of sharing a geographic border and signing
bilateral tax treaties or trade agreements is constrained to M&As of developing targets.
Thus, trade costs appear to play a larger role in M&A decisions when acquisition targets
are located outside of the developed world.
Contrary to commonly held beliefs, however, factor endowments do not seem to attract
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investment into developing countries. Education levels, which proxy for skilled-labor
endowments, have no effect on M&A activity. Moreover, evidence suggests lower wages
drive investment into developed rather than developing countries. A potential explanation
is factor endowments drive only vertical M&As, but results change very little when
isolating the analysis to vertical M&As. I also compare how endowments of
communications and financial infrastructure impact deals in developed and developing
countries. Surprisingly, both promote M&As only of developed targets.
In general, I fail to find strong evidence that FDI between developed country pairs is
horizontal whereas developed-developing country investment flows are predominantly
vertical. Rather, it seems the proportion of M&As that are horizontal or vertical is largely
independent of country development. Some evidence even suggests the proportion of
M&As that are vertical is higher in more developed countries. I find trade costs to be more
important for developing countries, but the evidence provides no clear support for the
comparative advantage theory of vertical FDI. The empirical results are roughly consistent
with the main conclusions of Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who found vertical FDI is not
driven by factor endowments since much of it occurs within the developed world. It
appears vertical investments take place between more proximate stages of production than
has been the case in the past.
The essay proceeds by first discussing cross-border M&A activity worldwide and the
relative patterns across developed and developing countries. The third section presents the
empirical model and discusses the expected findings. The results are presented in the
fourth section, and the final section offers some concluding comments.
3.2 M&A Patterns
Data on cross-border M&As come from the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database
compiled by Thomson, which began in 1985 for international transactions involving at
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least a five percent ownership change in a firm. Thomson’s sources include over 200
English and foreign language news sources, SEC filings and their international
counterparts, trade publications, wires, and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law
firms, and other advisors. Thomson data have the advantage of the most expansive
coverage of any other FDI source (Blonigen and Piger, 2012). In line with much of the
literature, I define a merger as a transaction where an acquiring firm obtains a majority
equity position in the target firm via acquiring at least 50 percent ownership or, if already
owning 50 percent or more, acquiring all remaining equity to obtain 100 percent interest
in the target firm. Distinguishing cross-border from domestic deals is left to Thomson, and
I focus on announced rather than completed dates, although this distinction is not likely to
be important since nearly 100 percent of cross-border M&As announced between
1990-2008 are consummated within the period. Moreover, over 90 percent of all
consummated deals are completed in the same year of announcement.
Figure 3.1 shows the trends in cross-border M&As over the 1990-2008 period. Using
2012 classifications of UNCTAD, I distinguish between developed and developing
countries and show the relative cross-border M&A activity in each.35 Specifically,
“Developed" denotes cross-border M&As involving two developed countries while
“Developing" M&As involve at least one developing country.36 The left figure illustrates
cross-border M&As follow the business cycle, with M&A activity rising during economic
expansions and falling during recessions. Most deals take place between developed
countries, but it is clear from the figure on the right that developing countries are
becoming more active in the M&A market. For example, Developing M&As comprised
just under 10 percent of global activity in 1990, but by 2008 they made up one third.37
35Transition economies are lumped in with developing countries. Table A2.4 provides the full list of countries
by development status.
36“Worldwide" is the sum of Developed and Developing.
37Of the Developing deals, approximately half flow from developed to developing countries while 20 percent
flow in the opposite direction. The remaining 30 percent of M&As flow between developing countries.
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The geographic dispersion of acquiring and target firms is given in Figure 3.2, with the
left side showing Developed M&As and the right side showing Developing M&As.
Cross-border M&A activity is arranged according to Thomson’s regional classification
system: Africa/Middle East/Central Asia (AF), Americas (AM), Asia-Pacific (excluding
Central Asia) (AP), Europe (EU), Japan (JP), Supranational38 (SN). To no surprise, the
majority of Developed deals involve either European or American (especially U.S.) firms.
M&As between the U.S. and Canada alone make up nearly 17 percent of all Developed
deals, and a massive 47 percent of Developed deals involve two European firms.39 An
example of the latter is the acquisition of the German Mannesmann AG by the British
Vodafone Airtouch PLC in 1999 for a hefty $202.8 billion, which remains one of the
largest deals in the world to date.
In contrast to Developed M&As, which concentrate in Western Europe, Canada, and the
U.S., the majority of Developing M&A activity concentrates in the Americas and the
Asia-Pacific region. M&As in the latter comprise 21 percent of all Developing M&A
activity, and these deals typically involve the developing nations of China, Hong Kong,
India, Malaysia, or Singapore. For example, in 2008 China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd.
purchased 53 percent equity in the Hong Kong based Wing Lung Bank Ltd. for just under
$2.5 billion. M&As within the Americas, in contrast, comprise 19 percent of all
Developing deals and typically involve a developed country’s firm acquiring a developing
country’s firm. Specifically, two-thirds originate in the U.S. or Canada, of which over half
target firms in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico. For example, in 2004 Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
purchased the Brazilian supermarket chain Bompreco SA Supermercados do Nordeste for
$300 million. Thus, M&As in the Asia-Pacific typically flow between developing nations
whereas M&As in the Americas typically flow from developed to developing nations.
Figure 3.3 shows cross-border M&A activity by industry of acquiring and target firms. I
38Supranational M&As involve firms without a unique nationality.
39The top European economies, in order of M&A activity, are the U.K., Germany, and France.
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use SIC codes to define sector groupings in the following manner, with SIC codes in
parentheses: Agriculture (Ag.) (1-17), Manufacturing (Manu.) (20-39), Transport (40-49),
Trade (50-59), Finance (60-67), Services (70-89).40 For Developed M&As, 30 percent of
deals take place between manufacturing firms. The next largest sector by M&A activity is
the service industry, which comprises approximately 17 percent of all Developed M&As.
An example is when the U.S.-based eBay Inc. paid $4.3 billion for the Luxembourg-based
Skype Technologies SA in 2005.
The right side of Figure 3.3 provides Developing M&A activity by sector. As with
Developed M&As, the manufacturing sector experiences the most Developing M&A
activity. Over one fourth of all deals involve two manufacturing firms. The second most
active Developing sector, however, is different than that for Developed M&As. Whereas
the service sector experienced the second most Developed M&A activity, the financial
sector experienced the second most Developing M&A activity over the 1990-2008 period.
Over one fourth of all acquirers and 16 percent of all targets were financial firms, and 13
percent of all Developing deals were marriages between financial firms. A recent example
of the latter is when the British financial services giant, Barclays PLC, purchased the
South African bank, Absa Group Ltd., in 2005 for just under $5 billion in order to expand
its operations in markets outside of the U.K.
In general, Figure 3.3 shows most cross-border M&A activity is intra-industry41, and
further that most occurs in the manufacturing sector. A very active M&A market in the
manufacturing sector is appealing for the purposes of this essay for two reasons. First and
foremost, manufacturing firms are at the heart of the horizontal and vertical MNE
models.42 Second, manufacturing output tends to be tradable, which enables one to
40“Agriculture" includes mining and construction while “Trade" aggregates both wholesale and retail trade.
Public administration is excluded due to the lack of deals in this sector.
41Over two thirds of worldwide cross-border M&A activity is intra-industry based on sector grouping in
Figure 3.3.
42See Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) for early work on horizontal and vertical FDI, respectively.
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compare the effect of trade costs on M&As into developed or developing economies.
Recall, trade costs are expected to discourage vertical and possibly promote horizontal
FDI, where vertical tends to flow into developing countries and horizontal is thought to
flow between developed nations. Hence, the remainder of the analysis will focus on
cross-border M&As in the manufacturing sector.
The horizontal and vertical MNE theories suggest horizontal FDI should flow between
developed country pairs whereas vertical FDI should flow from developed to developing
countries. The former stems from the convergence hypothesis put forward by Markusen
and Venables (1996), which posits horizontal investment will flow between more similar
countries. The latter, however, is suggested by comparative advantage ideas which claim
larger cross-country endowment differences will create larger relative wage gaps, thereby
increasing the attractiveness of fragmenting production vertically. In order to test such
theories, I identify horizontal and vertical cross-border M&As using methods found in the
literature. Horizontal M&As represent marriages of competing firms, which researchers
commonly identify by mergers between firms in the same industry. Adopting this
definition, I define a deal as horizontal if the merging firms are located in the same
four-digit SIC industry.43 Vertical M&As, in contrast, are combinations of firms in
buyer-supplier relationships. To be labeled vertical, a M&A must take place between firms
in different four-digit SIC industries provided the industries are linked with sufficiently
large intermediate input flows, which I measure using the BEA’s I-O tables. Furthermore,
I follow the literature and use a threshold of five percent input flow between industries.44
As discussed in Chapter 2, there exists some variation in the literature on how deals are
defined when firms do business in multiple sectors. The Thomson data set assigns both
primary and secondary SIC codes to firms; primary being the industry in which the firm
43The definition of a horizontal M&A of course disregards the geographical dimension to the relevant market.
See Chapter 2 for more discussion on this topic.
44Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the BEA’s I-O tables, using different intermediate input
flow thresholds, and why I do not use intra-firm trade to identify vertical M&As.
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does most business, and secondary being other industries in which it does business.45
Many of the firms active in the M&A market are large, multiproduct firms who do
business in multiple industries. Thus, the number of horizontal and vertical M&As
identified will depend on whether one uses only primary SIC sectors or both primary and
secondary SIC sectors. Finding more or less with the addition of secondary SIC sectors
will depend on whether or not M&As are simultaneously considered horizontal and
vertical. Chapter 2 describes the issue in greater detail and also defines three different
ways to define horizontal and vertical M&As, which I use here.
Table 3.1 provides the percentages of manufacturing M&As that are horizontal and
vertical over the 1990-2008 period for all countries in the Thomson data set. With the
exception of 2008, horizontal and vertical percentages are given in two-year averages and
M&A totals sum over both years.46 I include summary statistics using all three definitions
and, following the previous figures, I separate Developed and Developing M&As. Across
the three different ways to define horizontal and vertical deals, a few patterns stand out.
Notably, the number of deals identified as horizontal or vertical is highly dependent on the
definition used. Fewer horizontal M&As are found when using definition 2 rather than
definition 1, which occurs because some horizontal deals in primary industries have
vertically related industries in secondary sectors, thereby being conglomerate using
definition 2. In contrast, definition 3 finds more horizontal deals than does definition 1,
which happens because some deals are horizontal in secondary industries but not in
primary industries. Each pattern emerges because most firms active in the M&A market
are large, multiproduct firms who do business in multiple sectors. Similar patterns follow
for the percentage of vertical M&As identified using the three different definitions.
Comparisons between Developed and Developing M&As show some similarities, but also
45Firms are assigned as many secondary SIC codes as industries in which they do business.
46Note that summing the percent horizontal with the percent vertical is not meant to sum to one due to the
presence of conglomerate M&As, which comprise all deals not identified as horizontal or vertical.
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two noticeable differences. Both find approximately one fourth and two thirds of deals to
be horizontal using definitions 2 and 3, respectively. Similarly, both find roughly 15
percent of M&As to be vertical using definitions 1 and 2. Definition 1, however, shows
more horizontal for Developing than Developed M&As. The common belief is the
majority of FDI flows between developed countries is horizontal, but Table 3.1 shows
horizontal activity is no less prevalent in developing countries. Definition 3 also finds
more vertical for Developing than Developed M&As. Thus, M&As between multisector
firms tend to have more vertically-related industries when at least one of the merging
parties is located in a developing country. In general, however, Table 3.1 does not show
strong support for the idea that horizontal FDI is mostly developed-developed or most
developed-developing activity is vertical.47 Rather, it appears patterns of horizontal and
vertical M&As are similar regardless of country development.
I provide a simple empirical exercise to more rigorously examine how the composition of
M&As depends on country development. In particular, I regress the vertical percentage of
M&As, denoted PV ERT , on country development and gravity variables. The empirical
specification is given by:
E[PV ERTklt|Yk, Yl, Distancekl, yk, yl] = exp(β0 + β1lnYkt + β2lnYlt
+ β3lnDistancekl + β4lnykt + β5lnylt) (1)
where the dependent variable represents the percent of bilateral cross-border M&As that
are vertical between countries k and l in time t over the 1990-2008 period. The gravity
variables are denoted by Y and Distance, which are real GDP and bilateral distance
between countries k and l, respectively. Country development is measured with real GDP
per capita (y). Following both Chapter 2 and the main empirical model in section 3.3,
47Developing statistics presented in Table 3.1 remain unchanged when isolating M&As from developed to
developing countries.
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equation 1 represents a nonlinear empirical model to be estimated by PPML as
recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).48
The results are given in Table 3.2. Following Table 3.1, I present results using all three
definitions of vertical M&As. P corresponds to vertical M&A percentage using definition
1, while PS-N and PS-O correspond to definitions 2 and 3, respectively, as represented in
Table 3.1. I estimate equation 1 using both bilateral M&A flows and M&A inflows. The
left-most column of output in Table 3.2 suggests the percent of primary SIC vertical deals
is independent of target country development (yl), but it is higher for less developed
acquirers (yk). Results using the most strict definition of M&As are given in the second
column of output, which shows positive correlation between both target and acquirer
development and the vertical proportion of M&As. The positive correlation goes away,
however, if one uses definition 3 of vertical deals. Thus, similar to Table 3.1, Table 3.2
provides no clear support for the idea that less developed countries host higher proportions
of vertical investments.
I replicate the analysis for M&As inflows as a robustness check.49 The results are given in
the last three columns of Table 3.2. Once again, I find positive correlation between target
country development and vertical M&A percentage. The results, however, do not hold
across all three definitions of vertical deals. Overall, the results of Table 3.2 fail to show
vertical FDI dominates in less developed countries. In contrast, some evidence suggests
the proportion of vertical FDI is higher in more developed countries. In the next section I
develop an empirical model that examines whether cross-border M&A determinants have
different effects depending on both country development and the type of merger.
48The results remain statistically unchanged when estimating the following linear model via OLS:
PV ERTklt = β0 + β1lnYkt + β2lnYlt + β3lnDistancekl + β4lnykt + β5lnylt + .
49I replace bilateral distance with a measure of target country remoteness to control for trade costs. See
Section 3.3 and Table A2.2 for a more detailed description of ρl.
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3.3 Econometric Model
The econometric specification used in the current essay is motivated by the theoretical
framework of Head and Ries (2008). The general idea is bilateral M&As occur as a result
of an endogenous bidding process whereby firms across the globe compete for control
rights on a foreign subsidiary. The probability that a particular firm submits the winning
bid is given by the probability it anticipates a higher target value than do competing
bidders. Head and Ries derived the probability to be an exponential function of the
number and ability of firms at home, the number and ability of competing bidders in other
countries, and physical and cultural distance between home and target countries. In the
end, the expected number of bilateral M&As between a country pair was shown to be a
nonlinear function of both home and foreign market sizes, home firm abilities, bid
competition from third countries, and physical and cultural distance measures.
Building off of the ideas of Head and Ries, I construct an empirical model which
incorporates the standard FDI determinants. Importantly, the model includes measures of
both trade costs and factor endowments in order to test for differences between mergers
flowing into developed and developing countries, and therefore horizontal and vertical
investments. As discussed above, both trade costs and factor endowments should have a
stronger effect on deals involving target firms in developing countries. By way of
intra-firm trade, trade costs should deter vertical investments. The ability to substitute
horizontal investments for exports, however, suggests trade costs have a smaller impact on
horizontal investments. Likewise, factor endowment is expected to be important in the
location of vertical investments, but it should have less influence on the location of
horizontal investments. Thus, both trade costs and factor endowments should have a
relatively stronger effect on developing countries, stronger negative effect of trade costs
and stronger positive effect of factor endowment.
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A number of other country characteristics have been shown to affect cross-border
investments. Real GDP and physical distance are frequently included in empirical trade
and FDI studies to account for gravity between countries. Real GDP per capita is also
often included to account for average incomes which, along with real GDP, is expected to
promote cross-border investments. Remoteness, on the other hand, is often used to control
for the idea that remote countries tend to engage less in international commerce due to
their disadvantageous physical location. The idea is most often applied to international
trade, but Hijzen et al. (2008) and Head and Ries (2008) have used analogous variables to
measure multilateral trade costs and bid competition, respectively. Profitability is another
factor influencing a firm’s decision to enter a foreign market, where higher expected
corporate profits are likely to induce more M&As. Similarly, both communications and
financial infrastructure are likely to affect foreign investment. Portes et al. (2001) and
Portes and Rey (2005) have shown better communications infrastructure can facilitate
cross-border investment flows due the presence of information costs when crossing
national boundaries, and di Giovanni (2005) similarly showed financial depth to be
important for cross-border M&A activity. A number of authors have also shown firms
tend to “cherry-pick" the most productive foreign firms when looking to enter distant
markets.50 Finally, cultural, political, and institutional differences between countries are
likely to limit the flow of cross-border investments.
Building an empirical model around the above-described, standard determinants of FDI, I
compare cross-border M&A flows along two dimensions: country development and type
of M&A, horizontal or vertical. With the theoretical framework of Head and Ries in mind,
I incorporate such determinants of M&As into a nonlinear empirical model to be
estimated by PPML as recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Denoting the
acquiring and target countries as k and l, respectively, the baseline econometric
50See Blonigen et al. (2012), among others, for a recent study on cherry-picking.
58
specification is given by:
E[mklt,d|covariates] = exp(β0 + β1lnYkt + β2lnYlt + β3lnykt + β4lnylt
+ β5lnDistancekl + β6lnρlt + β7lnTaxRatekt + β8lnTaxRatelt
+ β9lnPhoneLineskt + β10lnPhoneLineslt + β11lnStockMktkt
+ β12lnStockMktlt + β13lnEducationkt + β14lnEducationlt
+ β15CommonLanguagekl + β16Colonykl + β17Contiguouskl
+ β18BTTklt + β19RTAklt) (2)
which will produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest so long as the
conditional expectation of mklt, the number of cross-border M&As between country k and
country l in time t, is correctly specified (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).51 All
variables are in natural logarithms (denoted with “ln") with the exception of dummy
variables. Y and y are real GDP and real GDP per capita, respectively. Distancekl is the
bilateral distance between countries k and l, while ρl is a multilateral index of trade costs
for the target country.52 The latter has been used as a measure of remoteness by both
Hijzen et al. (2008) and Head and Ries (2008). TaxRate is the highest marginal corporate
tax rate in a country, which proxies for corporate profitability. PhoneLines and
StockMkt proxy for communications and financial infrastructure, respectively. The
former represents the number of telephone lines per 100 people, while the latter is the
stock market-to-GDP ratio in each country. I proxy skilled-labor endowment with
Education, which is the average number of years of total education in each country.
CommonLanguage, Colony, and Contiguous are dummy variables denoting when
countries share a common official language, a common colonizer, and a geographic
border, respectively. The former two variables measure cultural distance between
51Note the direction of acquisition matters (i.e. mkl 6= mlk).
52ρl =
∑
k 6=l
Distancekl
Yk
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countries and the latter is another measure of physical distance. Having signed bilateral
tax treaties or regional trade agreements is captured by the dummy variables BTT and
RTA, respectively. The latter two variables also measure bilateral trade costs.
Table 3.3 provides the expected effects of each variable, which are broken down by type
of investment. Distance, ρl, Contiguous, CommonLanguage, Colony, BTT , and
RTA all measure trade costs. As discussed above, distance should have an attenuated or
positive effect on horizontal investments while strictly discouraging all other types of
investment. The effect of ρl may also vary across different types of investment. In
empirical international trade studies, remoteness dampens trade flows, suggesting ρl may
have a negative effect on cross-border M&As as well. However, ρl is constructed
following Hijzen et al. (2008), who use it as an index of multilateral trade costs. It is
expected to promote cross-border M&As because larger values imply less bid competition
for a given country k from bidders in competing countries. However, more remote
countries are likely to experience fewer horizontal M&As due to pre-emptive buyouts
from competing firms (Hijzen et al., 2008).
Previous research has also found sharing a common official language, sharing a common
colonizer, and having regional trade agreements in place can facilitate cross-border
M&As. Many authors have shown deals are more common between countries that speak
the same language (e.g. di Giovanni (2005), Berger et al. (2004), Head and Ries (2008)),
while Head and Ries (2008) have found colonization variables to be important in
promoting cross-border M&A flows. Similarly, Hijzen et al. (2008), di Giovanni (2005),
and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) all have shown trade agreements encourage cross-border
deals. Accordingly, I expect each variable to encourage M&A flows. Similarly, sharing a
contiguous border and ratifying BTTs are expected to facilitate cross-border M&A flows
between countries. Physical adjacency implies both relatively low trade costs and cultural
proximity, both of which are likely to encourage cross-border deals. BTTs are expected to
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reduce the costs, and therefore raise profits, of doing business internationally. As a result,
tax treaties should positively correlate with M&A activity.
The main factor endowment variables are real GDP per capita and education. The
cherry-picking story of cross-border M&As suggests countries with more skilled
workforces will tend to produce productive firms which are highly attractive acquisition
targets. Thus, more educated, high-wage countries are expected to experience more M&A
activity. The effect of skilled-labor endowment on vertical M&As, however, should be
very different. Countries with more skilled workforces will be attractive for FDI, but
acquiring firms will tend to seek out relatively lower wages for vertical investments. In
other words, higher wages are expected to correlate positively with outward vertical
investment but negatively with inward vertical investment. Since developing countries are
most likely to host vertical investments, the negative effect of wages should be strongest
for developing targets.
The remaining variables include country size, tax rates, and capital endowments. The
number of firms is expected to be larger in larger countries, so higher GDP should have a
positive effect on cross-border M&As. By affecting corporate profits, higher tax rates at
home are expected to encourage international M&As, while lower tax rates abroad will
tend to produce more attractive targets. Better communications and financial
infrastructure provide rough proxies of capital endowment. Both Portes et al. (2001) and
Portes and Rey (2005) have shown better communications infrastructure promotes
cross-border asset trade, and di Giovanni (2005) similarly showed positive correlation
between stock market and cross-border M&A activity. Therefore, both PhoneLines and
StockMkt are expected to encourage M&As.
Equation 2 above provides the baseline empirical model, which I estimate via PPML with
1990-2008 data. I compare results by country development and then by horizontal and
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vertical deals for robustness. Table A2.2 provides data definitions and sources, and Table
A2.1 provides summary statistics.
3.4 Results
I first examine the effect of various measures of trade costs on cross-border M&As, and
then analyze how measures of factor endowment are likely to have heterogeneous effects
on deals involving developing countries. Most FDI flows between developed country
pairs, but Figure 3.1 shows developing countries have become more active in the M&A
market over time. The common belief is horizontal FDI concentrates between developed
country pairs, whereas FDI flowing from developed to developing countries is typically
vertical. If true, then one should find trade costs and factor endowments to have a stronger
effect for developing countries. Section 3.4.1 examines the heterogeneous effect of trade
costs, while the effect of factor endowment is explored in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Trade Costs
The results obtained from estimating equation 2 are provided in Table 3.4. To direct
attention to trade costs, I place the coefficient estimates of all such variables at the top of
the table. The first column of output provides the baseline results. In general, I get the
standard results. Some surprising results are sharing a national border, signing bilateral
tax treaties, and more highly educated populaces have no effect on cross-border M&As.
Likewise, higher corporate tax rates and better communications infrastructure
(lnPhoneLines) at home do not promote outward investment as expected.
Turning attention to the second column of output, I allow the effect of a number of trade
cost measures to vary by the development status of the target country. Trade costs are
likely to have a much stronger effect on cross-border M&As when targets are located in
developing countries, especially if the deals are vertical. To capture any potential
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differential effect, I interact trade cost variables with δ, a dummy variable taking the value
of one when the target is a developing country and zero otherwise.53 Physical distance
(lnDistance) has a negative effect on cross-border investment but, as shown by the
negative and significant coefficient on δ · lnDistance, its effect is much stronger when the
target resides in a developing country. Remoteness has a positive effect on cross-border
M&As, but inclusion of the interaction term suggests the positive effect is constrained to
developing countries. Similarly, sharing a national border only promotes cross-border
M&As flowing into developing targets.
The same pattern follows for the remaining trade cost variables. Cultural distance, as
measured by CommonLanguage and Colony, has different effects on developing
countries. Sharing an official language promotes M&As in all countries, but its effect is
stronger for developing countries. In contrast, colonial ties promote M&As into developed
countries while discouraging M&As into developing nations. The coefficients on BTT
and RTA also suggest political and institutional similarities are important for developing
targets, but not for developed targets. Notably, the signs and significance on the remaining
variables follow the previous discussion.
The right-most two columns of output provide robustness checks to the above-described
results. The common belief is horizontal investment flows between developed, and thus
more similar, countries whereas most vertical FDI flows from developed to developing
countries. The dependent variable in the third column of output is the number of
horizontal M&As, while that for the right-most column of output is the number of vertical
M&As. Although the tariff-jumping argument posits trade costs should have a relatively
larger effect on vertical investment as compared with horizontal, I find multiple measures
of trade costs to have a similar effect.54 Thus, the type of M&A has no significant impact
53Developing countries include both transition and developing countries as given in Table A2.4.
54Notably, the effect of distance is larger for horizontal than vertical deals. Although surprising, the result
supports one of the key findings in Chapter 2.
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on the effect of trade costs. Although the results seem to challenge long-held beliefs about
patterns of horizontal and vertical FDI, they support the patterns shown in Table 3.1.
Horizontal and vertical investments are found in roughly equal proportions in both
developed and developing countries. The type of M&A does not matter, but country
development does, as trade costs have a stronger effect on developing country FDI.55
3.4.2 Factor Endowments
The idea of factor endowment driving cross-border M&As is based on comparative
advantage theory which, simply put, suggests cross-country wage differences will entice a
multinational firm to vertically fragment production processes across national borders.
Thus, according to the theory, one should expect more vertical M&As to flow between
countries with larger disparities in wages. Since developed countries tend to pay the
highest wages and developing countries the lowest, vertical investments should flow from
developed to developing nations. I examine such ideas by interacting endowment
variables with δ, as above. The interaction terms capture any differential effect between
developed and developing target countries.
Table 3.5 provides the results, once again positioning variables of interest at the top of the
table to direct attention. The first column of output replicates that in Table 3.4 with the
exception that I replace real GDP per capita variables with wage variables, which provide
more direct measures of average hourly earnings.56 The results follow from Table 3.4 with
the exception being wages in target countries have no effect on cross-border M&As.
When allowing the effect of endowment variables to vary by target development, however,
some interesting results emerge. Most importantly, lower wages in developing countries
55Table A2.5 provides results when controlling for the development of both the acquiring and target countries.
Table A2.6 and Table A2.7 provide robustness checks for horizontal and vertical M&As, respectively.
56See Table A2.2 for a description of the wage data. Note: corr(y, wage) = 0.81. Furthermore, Table A2.8
provides results when using real GDP per capita instead of wage data.
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do not attract M&As. A potential explanation for the result is wages drive only vertical
M&As. The right-most column of output provides no support for the explanation, while
the third column of output suggests lower wages attract horizontal deals into developed
countries. The results, therefore, provide evidence that seems to contradict theory: lower
wages drive horizontal rather than vertical investments. However, vertical M&As do flow
into less educated developing countries, a result consistent with the idea that firms move
unskilled-labor-intensive production processes to countries with relatively more unskilled
workers. Because the effect of wage and education levels fail to agree, however, it is
difficult to ascertain firms exploit developing nations for their comparative advantage in
low-skilled manufacturing processes.
Results from the remaining interaction effects suggest communication and financial
infrastructure are less important for developing countries. More phone lines are correlated
with more M&As, but the effect is attenuated for developing target countries (0.947 -
0.563 = 0.384). Similarly, a booming stock market has almost no effect in attracting
M&As when the country is developing (0.143 - 0.151 = -0.008).57 The latter result is
robust to horizontal and vertical M&As, as are many of the remaining results. Thus, there
is little evidence suggesting endowment is more important for developing country FDI.
3.5 Conclusion
The current essay offers one of the few empirical analyses studying cross-border M&As
into both developed and developing countries. Recent FDI patterns indicate most activity
in the developed world takes the form of horizontal cross-border M&As, whereas
investment into developing nations is largely vertical greenfield FDI. The current essay
improves our understanding of global cross-border M&A trends in two ways. First,
57Table A2.3 provides Wald tests for the hypotheses that linear combinations of the coefficients sum to zero.
Results indicate phone lines have a positive effect for developing target countries while education has a
negative effect.
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cross-border M&As are becoming more prevalent in developing countries as
improvements in economic conditions facilitate deals from both the buy and sell side.
Second, the proportion of horizontal and vertical cross-border M&As is independent of
country development. In other words, it is not the case that most developed-developed
deals are horizontal or most developed-developing M&As are vertical.
Using a PPML estimator and standard FDI determinants found in the literature, I test
whether the effect of many different variables depends on country development. Results
suggest trade costs have a larger effect on M&As involving targets in developing
countries, whereas no clear support is found for the idea that factor endowments pull
vertical investment into developing nations. Findings are based on multiple measures of
trade costs as well as wage and education data, respectively. Overall, both the summary
statistics and empirical results are consistent with a small but growing literature finding
evidence that vertical FDI is not only more common between developed countries than
previously believed, it is also not driven by traditional comparative advantage.
Future research is needed to better understand the evolution of international investment
over time. Different patterns of cross-country horizontal and vertical investment were
expected to drive differences between developed and developing countries, but the current
essay finds the type of investment has little bearing on how country characteristics
influence investment. Future study should examine greenfield FDI to see if such results are
exclusive to M&As, and it would also be helpful to explain what drives vertical investment
between developed nations. A better understanding of cross-country investment patterns
would benefit firms who are choosing how to penetrate new foreign markets, and it would
also educate policy to help countries attract or discourage certain types of investment.
Copyright c©Derrick T. Jenniges, 2014
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Cross-border M&A activity by country development
Figure 3.2: Cross-border M&A activity by region (1990-2008)
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Table 3.1: Percentage of horizontal and vertical M&As by country development
Developed Developing
Year Horizontal Vertical Total
M&As
Horizontal Vertical Total
M&As
1. Primary SIC (P)
1990-1991 35.5 14.8 1,895 43.5 12.9 147
1992-1993 37.9 14.6 1,709 41.7 11.1 216
1994-1995 34.0 14.0 2,021 42.9 11.7 427
1996-1997 37.1 13.1 2,415 47.7 12.8 619
1998-1999 35.8 15.0 3,013 39.6 16.3 755
2000-2001 36.3 14.1 2,717 42.5 13.9 746
2002-2003 40.1 11.6 1,833 48.5 13.9 633
2004-2005 42.3 13.1 2,073 44.2 13.7 844
2006-2007 43.2 11.4 2,590 47.9 15.9 1,096
2008 44.7 12.5 1,223 50.9 8.5 568
1990-2008 38.4 13.5 21,489 45.3 13.6 6,051
2. Primary and secondary SIC (no overlap) (PS-N)
1990-1991 26.9 19.5 1,895 28.6 14.3 147
1992-1993 29.4 18.1 1,709 31.0 14.4 216
1994-1995 24.3 19.4 2,021 22.0 16.2 427
1996-1997 26.7 18.4 2,415 28.1 14.9 619
1998-1999 25.5 17.9 3,013 24.9 19.5 755
2000-2001 26.1 17.7 2,717 20.8 17.4 746
2002-2003 25.2 16.8 1,833 26.1 18.0 633
2004-2005 21.2 16.7 2,073 24.3 16.7 844
2006-2007 19.7 16.9 2,590 17.7 15.2 1,096
2008 20.7 16.5 1,223 16.7 14.6 568
1990-2008 24.6 17.8 21,489 22.8 16.4 6,051
3. Primary and secondary SIC (overlap) (PS-O)
1990-1991 60.4 53.0 1,895 69.4 55.1 147
1992-1993 60.1 48.9 1,709 69.0 52.3 216
1994-1995 56.3 51.3 2,021 64.2 58.3 427
1996-1997 59.8 51.4 2,415 67.0 53.8 619
1998-1999 61.3 53.7 3,013 64.4 58.9 755
2000-2001 64.0 55.6 2,717 69.2 65.8 746
2002-2003 66.7 58.3 1,833 71.7 63.7 633
2004-2005 69.5 65.1 2,073 72.4 64.8 844
2006-2007 71.0 68.2 2,590 76.6 74.2 1,096
2008 73.1 68.9 1,223 77.1 75.0 568
1990-2008 63.9 57.1 21,489 70.8 64.5 6,051
Since every M&A involves one acquiring firm and one target firm, percentages can be interpreted from
either the buy or the sell side of deals.
Definition 1 uses only primary SIC codes to identify horizontal and vertical M&As, while definitions 2
and 3 use both primary and secondary SIC codes. Definition 3 allows M&As to be simultaneously labeled
horizontal and vertical, while definition 2 defines a deal as horizontal, for example, if the merging firms
are horizontally related in at least one industry and operate in no industries sharing a vertical connection.
The same logic applies to definition 2 for vertical M&As, and it follows definition 2 is more strict than
definition 3.
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Figure 3.3: Cross-border M&A activity by sector (1990-2008)
Table 3.2: PPML estimation results: percent of deals that are vertical
Bilateral Inflows
P PS-N PS-O P PS-N PS-O
lnYk 0.003 -0.032* 0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.006)
lnYl -0.002 0.028* -0.002 -0.056 0.034 0.005
(0.021) (0.017) (0.006) (0.041) (0.038) (0.010)
lnDistancekl 0.007 0.066*** 0.035***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.008)
lnρl 0.149 0.111* 0.098***
(0.096) (0.062) (0.034)
lnyk -0.155** 0.157** 0.001
(0.067) (0.062) (0.020)
lnyl 0.060 0.124*** 0.023 0.144** 0.145** 0.016
(0.047) (0.044) (0.015) (0.073) (0.057) (0.022)
Constant -1.398 -5.183*** -0.871*** -4.422*** -3.632*** -0.870***
(0.876) (0.818) (0.257) (0.940) (0.710) (0.272)
Log-pseudolikelihood -2,822.0 -3,282.7 -6,406.5 -475.8 -506.5 -1,065.4
Observations 7,322 7,322 7,322 1,265 1,265 1,265
The dependent variable is the percent of all deals that are vertical. P corresponds to vertical M&A percent-
age using definition 1, while PS-N and PS-O correspond to definitions 2 and 3, respectively as represented
in Table 3.1. Estimations include time and developing country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered by country pairs (Bilateral) or target country (Inflows) are in parentheses. Significant coefficients
are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Expected effects of variables
All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
Yk + + +
Yl + + +
yk + + +
yl + + –
Distancekl – +/– –
ρl + – +
Contiguouskl + + +
CommonLanguagekl + + +
Colonykl + + +
BTTkl + + +
RTAkl + + +
Educationk + + +
Educationl + + +
TaxRatek + + +
TaxRatel – – –
PhoneLinesk + + +
PhoneLinesl + + +
StockMktk + + +
StockMktl + + +
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Table 3.4: PPML estimation results: trade costs
All M&As All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
lnDistancekl -0.444*** -0.462*** -0.520*** -0.430***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.070) (0.074)
δ · lnDistancekl -0.330*** -0.302** -0.346**
(0.112) (0.124) (0.158)
lnρl 0.231** 0.060 0.008 0.040
(0.112) (0.105) (0.110) (0.127)
δ · lnρl 1.717*** 1.308*** 2.295***
(0.198) (0.240) (0.302)
Contiguouskl 0.099 0.005 0.142 -0.095
(0.118) (0.127) (0.141) (0.164)
δ · Contiguouskl 0.475** 0.496* 0.449
(0.234) (0.266) (0.329)
CommonLanguagekl 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.714*** 0.868***
(0.105) (0.114) (0.131) (0.120)
δ · CommonLanguagekl 0.340* 0.359* 0.275
(0.180) (0.208) (0.226)
Colonykl 0.425*** 0.390*** 0.552*** 0.347**
(0.137) (0.150) (0.158) (0.164)
δ · Colonykl -0.648*** -0.823*** -0.713**
(0.225) (0.291) (0.326)
BTTkl 0.082 -0.011 -0.044 0.008
(0.081) (0.092) (0.108) (0.113)
δ ·BTTkl 0.297** 0.385** 0.401*
(0.150) (0.186) (0.222)
RTAkl 0.287*** 0.074 -0.007 0.017
(0.098) (0.141) (0.173) (0.188)
δ ·RTAkl 0.458** 0.538** 0.479*
(0.185) (0.231) (0.262)
lnYk 0.653*** 0.628*** 0.638*** 0.680***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.044) (0.055)
lnYl 0.724*** 0.724*** 0.722*** 0.773***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.052)
lnyk 0.675*** 0.578*** 0.656*** 0.662***
(0.107) (0.097) (0.123) (0.142)
lnyl -0.260** -0.319*** -0.455*** -0.183
(0.106) (0.102) (0.123) (0.143)
lnEducationk 0.197 0.109 -0.530* 0.173
(0.295) (0.276) (0.319) (0.357)
lnEducationl 0.051 0.372* 0.278 0.292
(0.253) (0.226) (0.299) (0.310)
lnTaxRatek -0.235 -0.118 -0.051 -0.319
(0.165) (0.144) (0.175) (0.237)
lnTaxRatel -0.423*** -0.454*** -0.671*** -0.422**
(0.147) (0.134) (0.163) (0.173)
lnPhoneLinesk -0.056 0.024 0.338* 0.054
(0.140) (0.138) (0.179) (0.175)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.565*** 0.717*** 0.734*** 0.876***
(0.115) (0.120) (0.129) (0.179)
lnStockMktk 0.314*** 0.313*** 0.202*** 0.356***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.061)
lnStockMktl 0.096*** 0.116*** 0.074** 0.121***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.036) (0.043)
Constant -5.106*** -9.797*** -7.067*** -16.776***
(1.302) (1.385) (1.729) (2.190)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 63,682 63,682 63,682 63,682
Estimations include time and developed country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses.
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: PPML estimation results: factor endowments
All M&As All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
lnWagek 0.751*** 0.750*** 0.806*** 0.764***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.125) (0.137)
lnWagel 0.006 -0.186* -0.364*** -0.027
(0.096) (0.112) (0.130) (0.162)
δ · lnWagel 0.272 0.371 0.046
(0.207) (0.244) (0.268)
lnEducationk 0.450 0.453 -0.271 0.739**
(0.299) (0.299) (0.337) (0.368)
lnEducationl -0.166 0.199 -0.154 0.350
(0.274) (0.386) (0.444) (0.452)
δ · lnEducationl -0.729 -0.065 -1.443**
(0.483) (0.597) (0.670)
lnTaxRatek -0.126 -0.136 -0.082 -0.342
(0.154) (0.152) (0.184) (0.233)
lnTaxRatel -0.321** -0.511*** -0.656*** -0.468**
(0.145) (0.178) (0.209) (0.219)
δ · lnTaxRatel 0.459 0.544 0.647
(0.301) (0.395) (0.403)
lnPhoneLinesk -0.256* -0.247* 0.097 -0.239
(0.136) (0.136) (0.175) (0.171)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.366*** 0.947*** 0.886** 1.130***
(0.116) (0.295) (0.348) (0.414)
δ · lnPhoneLinesl -0.563* -0.519 -0.483
(0.326) (0.393) (0.454)
lnStockMktk 0.297*** 0.301*** 0.180*** 0.386***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.057) (0.067)
lnStockMktl 0.092*** 0.143*** 0.124** 0.153**
(0.035) (0.050) (0.061) (0.073)
δ · lnStockMktl -0.151*** -0.156** -0.154**
(0.058) (0.069) (0.078)
lnYk 0.606*** 0.603*** 0.638*** 0.621***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.051)
lnYl 0.714*** 0.697*** 0.721*** 0.708***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.053) (0.058)
lnDistancekl -0.448*** -0.452*** -0.503*** -0.372***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.063) (0.069)
lnρl 0.243** 0.217** 0.133 0.218
(0.114) (0.109) (0.117) (0.133)
Contiguouskl 0.127 0.115 0.248* 0.058
(0.120) (0.120) (0.134) (0.163)
CommonLanguagekl 0.818*** 0.785*** 0.733*** 0.806***
(0.104) (0.110) (0.130) (0.112)
Colonykl 0.400*** 0.389*** 0.515*** 0.384***
(0.139) (0.132) (0.152) (0.136)
BTTkl -0.021 -0.017 -0.071 0.023
(0.083) (0.082) (0.097) (0.108)
RTAkl 0.229** 0.204** 0.138 0.243*
(0.096) (0.093) (0.122) (0.124)
Constant -1.478 -1.224 -1.520 -4.689**
(1.222) (1.492) (1.834) (2.027)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 23,046 23,046 23,046 23,046
Estimations include time and developed country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses.
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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4 Response of Merger Activity to European Commission Policy
4.1 Introduction
The past two decades have been characterized by decreasing trade barriers and fewer
restrictions on FDI flows. In addition, the corporate takeover market has become
increasingly active. Cross-border M&As flows have surged since the early 1990s, and
merger regulation across the world has increased as a result. Interestingly, the growing
cross-border M&A literature has largely neglected the effect of antitrust on cross-border
M&As. Many legal and corporate finance analyses have been conducted, but relatively
few economic analyses on the effects of competition authorities on cross-border M&As
exist (Evenett, 2004). In the present analysis, I help fill the void by examining the effect of
EU merger policy reform on M&As flowing into EU member countries.
The reform of the ECMR in 2004 provides an opportunity to quantify the effect of
antitrust policy. With the help of competition authorities in EU member states, the EC
enforces EU competition rules as outlined in ECMR. The first merger regulation in the EU
was signed on December 21, 1989 and became effective in September of 1990. The EC’s
jurisdiction covers all concentrations (e.g. mergers) with turnovers exceeding minimum
thresholds within the EU. The nationality of the involved parties is trivial; any activity
resulting in anti-competitive effects within the EU is subject to EC scrutiny. Although the
EC has intervened in mergers when the merging parties are not located in EU member
states (e.g. General Electric/Honeywell case in 2001), the majority of EC actions involve
firms based in EU countries.
Growing concern over challenges posed by cross-border mergers and the EU led the EC to
consider a revision of the ECMR in the early 2000s. Published on December 11, 2001,
Green Paper on the review of the Council Regulation No. 4064/89 was one of the first
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documents proposing revisions to the ECMR in order to meet the new challenges facing
the Commission. The EC subsequently approved a comprehensive merger control reform
package on December 11, 2002. Formal adoption of the amendments took place on
January 20, 2003, which were agreed upon by the EU Council of Ministers on November
28, 2003. Taking effect May 1, 2004, the ECMR reform represented the desire for merger
regulation in the EC to move towards a more effects-based approach rather than the
market dominance approach.58 The new legislation was likely catalyzed by three instances
in 2002 where the Court of First Instance overruled decisions of the EC to prohibit firms
from merging business activities, which highlighted weakness in the economic analyses
conducted by the EC. To achieve a more economic approach to merger regulation, the new
legislation scrapped the dominance test and instead focused on whether a concentration
would “significantly impede effective competition." The SIEC test, as it became known,
marked a convergence towards U.S. merger policy and represented arguably the most
important change in the reform. Other notable changes resulting from the reform include
the creation of an economic committee headed by a Chief Economist, more flexible time
limits for the EC, and the creation of horizontal merger guidelines. Any merger
announcements or agreements after May 1 were subject to the new policies while the
announcements or agreements prior to May 1 were subject to the old policies.
The reform was far from inconsequential, but the response of the corporate takeover
market appears yet to be satisfactorily answered. Reframing the dominance test as the
SIEC test represents more of a clarification of the law rather than a change in the law
itself, but the new test seems to have expanded the law to cover more mergers because
dominance is no longer required for a merger to be prohibited. That is, EC scrutiny has
been extended to more M&As which, all else equal, is expected to have a deterrence effect
58Prior to ECMR reform in 2004, any merger that “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded" would be declared incompatible with the
common market. The “dominance test" is essentially a two-part test that first requires the concentration cre-
ates a dominant position before the EC will consider whether the concentration will lead to any significant
impediments to competition.
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on cross-border M&As. Other policy changes, however, may stimulate M&A activity.
Concurrent work by Duso et al. (2012) finds the policy reform resulted in an improved
ability to predict decisions of the EC. The evidence contradicts the belief by some critics
that a more flexible EC would result in less predictability in merger decisions.
The current analysis seeks to quantify the effects of the 2004 ECMR reform on
cross-border M&A flows into EU countries. The reform appears to be well-received and
marks a movement in the positive direction for merger regulation in the EU. Measuring
the sentiment, however, requires a look into the data. Thus, the goal of the empirical
section is to identify how ECMR reforms effected cross-border M&As of EU firms. I use
cross-border M&A data from Thomson and a difference-in-difference framework to do so.
Results provide some evidence suggesting the reform triggered an increase in M&A
activity in EU countries, but the response is visible only with a specific set of acquiring
countries. Overall, the reform had no significant effect on M&A activity in the EU.
The essay proceeds by first discussing both the theoretical and empirical research studying
M&A activity and antitrust policy. The third section describes the difference-in-difference
estimator, identifies the countries used in the analysis, and shows cross-border M&A
patterns around the time of the reform. Section 4.3 also presents and discusses the
difference-in-difference estimation results, and the final section offers some concluding
remarks.
4.2 Literature Review
Both theoretical and empirical research have studied the relationship between
international mergers and merger regulation. The body of theoretical work is quite small,
and seems to focus on Cournot models. Studies by Head and Ries (1997) and Barros and
Cabral (1994) examined situations when competition authorities should either block or
allow international mergers. Since national antitrust authorities are generally concerned
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with domestic welfare, they may allow mergers that could be detrimental to world welfare.
Interestingly, Barros and Cabral stressed merger policy should reflect national regulators’
concern about domestic welfare even if mergers generate externalities on other countries.
Such situations pose the potential need for an international antitrust authority to pursue
world welfare maximization even if it means overturning decisions of national
competition authorities. Head and Ries derived cases where national and international
merger regulators would disagree. Given a merger would reduce world welfare, the
authors found national competition agencies should block the merger if it fails to generate
cost savings, but the same does not necessarily hold for a merger which reduces costs.
Acknowledging the increasingly globalized world, potentially large gains may be had by
creating an international antitrust authority that will, unlike national competition
authorities, pay attention to the negative externalities on third-party countries which may
result from international mergers.
Other theoretical work on competition authorities has focused on the relationship between
trade costs and merger regulation. Using a sequential merger formation model, Fumagalli
and Vasconcelos (2009) found trade costs and antitrust authorities to affect whether
mergers are domestic or cross-border. In other words, antitrust policies can be used to
discriminate against foreign investors. Horn and Levinsohn (2001) found trade
liberalization can lead to more strict domestic competition policies, but the study focused
on domestic rather than cross-border M&As. Moreover, the authors found no evidence
suggesting merger policies should be regulated at the international level despite the strong
relationship between trade policy and merger policy. The latter finding is at odds with the
general movement towards international competition policy.
The empirical literature studying cross-border M&As is growing, but the literature
analyzing merger laws is relatively small. Studies range from how merger laws impact
firm value to deterrence and relationships between political institutions and merger laws.
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Both Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Bris et al. (2007) found positive correlation between
merger laws and corporate value. Focusing on EU merger policies, Brady and Feinberg
(2000) also found enforcement of merger regulation to have significant effects on firm
value. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests antitrust policy, and more generally
corporate governance, is able to impact market values of firms. Moreover, Bris et al.
(2008) found merger laws can also affect market values of entire industries.
Researchers have also questioned the effect of political institutions on cross-border
M&As. Conybeare and Kim (2010) found countries with democratic political systems
were more likely to have merger laws, and Kim (2010) found merger laws to be more
strict in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Both studies improved our
understanding of the political environment conducive to merger laws, but how does this
link translate into the number of cross-border M&As flowing into such countries? The
evidence of Conybeare and Kim suggests more stringent merger laws discriminate more
heavily against cross-border deals than domestic deals. Evenett (2002) similarly found
merger laws reduce the flow of cross-border M&As into a country. In particular, the
author found mandatory pre-merger notification regimes provide the strongest deterring
effect when compared against mandatory post notification regimes and voluntary
notification regimes. Empirical estimates suggest mandatory pre-merger notification
regimes cut the inflow of cross-border M&As by half. Taken together, the evidence
presented by Conybeare and Kim and Evenett shows merger laws reduce cross-border
M&As, and Evenett showed the reduction to be substantial. Bris et al. (2007), however,
found merger laws can actually increase cross-border M&A activity. The authors argued
merger laws reduce information asymmetries across countries, which provides an
environment conducive to cross-border deals.
The above authors drew conclusions using data on both heterogeneous countries and
antitrust authorities. Focusing on a single change in antitrust would enable one to more
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clearly identify whether M&As increased or decreased as a result of the change. An
ongoing study by Duso et al. (2012) assesses the effectiveness of the policy changes
resulting from the EMCR reform of 2004 using multiple measures and a detailed data
set.59 Findings suggest merger policies have been effective in deterring anti-competitive
mergers without deterring pro-competitive M&As. Evidence also reveals more
anti-competitive M&As in the post reform period.60 Duso et al. educate the literature on
the effectiveness of ECMR reform policies, but the literature has yet to address the big
picture: has the reform reduced or expanded the flow of cross-border M&As into the EU?
The next section attempts to provide an answer.
4.3 Econometric Analysis
I now turn attention to the data and attempt to quantify the impact of the policy change on
cross-border M&A flows into EU countries. To do so, I employ a simple
difference-in-difference estimation procedure, which entails comparing M&A activity in
countries affected by the reform to that in countries not affected by the reform. Since EC
antitrust policy applies to any merger resulting in anti-competitive effects within the EU,
the countries most likely to be affected are EU countries.61 As shown it Table A3.1,
however, the EU grew by 10 countries in 2004. That is, the ECMR reform was
accompanied by an increase in the number of EU member states from 15 to 25.
Furthermore, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia followed suit in
2013. I sidestep potential self-selection issues in the group of EU countries by using only
59Other studies have more generally analyzed the policy actions of the EC. Empirical evidence casts doubt
on whether policy actions by the EC are consistent with its claimed goals of protecting consumers and
encouraging competition in markets. In particular, the results of Aktas et al. (2007) suggest the EC may
actually be protecting privileged firms in the EU.
60In a similar study, Seldeslachts et al. (2009) estimated the impact of antitrust actions (blocked mergers,
negotiated settlements, and monitorings) of 28 different antitrust jurisdictions on future merger frequencies
and found blocking mergers deters future mergers, but negotiated settlements do not deter mergers. Thus,
actions of antitrust authorities send strong signals to potential merging parties.
61As acknowledged above, countries outside the EU may also fall under EC jurisdiction if concentrations
outside the EU inhibit competition within the EU. Given the low frequency of such occasions, however, it
seems reasonable to assume EU countries are most affected by the reform.
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the 15 countries that were member states prior to 2004 while excluding from the analysis
completely the 12 countries newly minted in the EU in 2004 and 2007.62
In constructing a comparison group, I attempt to match a set of countries with very similar
characteristics to the EU group. Since EU countries are developed63, a simple way to
construct a comparison group would be to choose all developed countries without EU
membership. The latter essentially results in choosing all OECD countries without EU
membership status. Most countries with OECD membership are developed, and many are
located proximate to EU countries. Table 4.1 identifies the EU and comparison group
countries. The EU group consists of all countries with EU membership prior to the year
2000, while the comparison group similarly consists of all non-EU countries with OECD
membership prior to 2000. The year 2000 is chosen as a cutoff because I use the
2000-2003 period as the pre-reform period in the empirical estimations.
As noted in Table 4.1, the EU and comparison groups are used as target countries, so I
must also identify a group of acquiring countries. Because M&As of firms located inside
the EU are subject to ECMR provisions while M&As of firms located outside the EU
typically are not, the EU and comparison groups are selected as target countries. I create a
group of acquiring countries by holding constant the common countries active in
acquiring firms in the EU and comparison countries both before and after the 2004 reform.
That is, to be used as an acquiring country two conditions must be met: (1) the country
must have acquired at least one firm in a minimum of a single country from both the EU
and comparison groups, and (2) condition (1) must have been met in at least a single year
of both the pre-reform (2000-2003) and the post-reform (2005-2008) periods. The list of
acquiring countries is given in Table A3.2.
62Croatia is included since, as discussed below, the empirical analysis focuses on the 2000-2008 period. The
15 EU countries will henceforth be referred to as the EU group.
63See Table A2.4.
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In order to use a difference-in-difference estimator to identify any effect of the ECMR
reform, it is important to closely match pre-reform patterns of M&As into EU and
comparison countries. The top panel in Table A3.2 shows all countries meeting the criteria
to be an acquiring country. The list includes a mix of countries with or without OECD or
EU membership. Since the EU and comparison groups are selected based on EU and
OECD membership, I create subgroups of acquiring countries also based on OECD and
EU membership. Specifically, I identify three additional groups of acquiring countries:
one for non-OECD countries, one for non-EU countries, and another consisting of EU
countries. All three groups are subsets of the full list, and they effectively capture
developing countries, countries located outside the EU area, and the EU group,
respectively.
Figures 4.1-4.4 present annual cross-border M&As flowing into the EU and comparison
groups from all four groups of acquiring countries over the 1990-2008 period. I denote the
ECMR reform (May 2004) with a vertical line, and numbers of cross-border M&As are
given as an index relative to 2004.64 Each group of acquiring countries is provided in a
separate figure. Figure 4.1 shows the trends using the “All countries" group of acquirers.
M&A activity in the EU and comparison groups match up well, both before and after the
reform, providing no strong evidence of an ECMR reform effect. Figure 4.2 provides the
same picture using non-OECD countries as the acquirers. M&A patterns between the EU
and comparison groups match up reasonably well prior to 2004 with the exception of 1999
and 2000. However, M&A activity increased significantly in 2004 and 2005 for the EU
and comparison groups, respectively. The cause of rapid increases in M&A activity are
unknown, but the fact that activity in EU countries increased prior to activity in
comparison countries is quite interesting. Figure 4.3 shows activity from non-EU
countries. No clear effect of the ECMR reform emerges from the figure. When using EU
countries as the acquirers, however, there exists a more rapid increase in M&A activity in
64Figures 4.5-4.8 replicate Figures 4.1-4.4 for the raw number of cross-border M&As.
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2005 into EU countries as compared with the comparison countries, as illustrated in
Figure 4.4. In sum, there appears to be little evidence of an ECMR reform effect. Figure
4.4 shows some evidence consistent with an ECMR reform effect in 2005, but Figure 4.2
shows the most stark increase in M&A activity around the time of the reform. Thus, I
focus the main empirical analysis on M&As from non-OECD acquirers.
Proceeding to the estimation strategy, I now attempt to disentangle the economic effect of
the reform (i.e. the ECMR reform effect). In its general form, the outcome of interest, Y ,
can be modeled with the following equation:
Y = α + βdEU + γdpost + δ(dEU · dpost) +  (1)
where dEU is a binary variable indicating EU countries (equals one if EU and zero
otherwise) and dpost is a binary variable equaling zero in the pre-reform period and one in
the post-reform period. Thus, β is the effect of being an EU country while γ is the effect
of the time trend common to both the EU and comparison groups. The parameter of
interest, δ, captures the “true" effect of the ECMR reform and is thus labeled the
difference-in-difference estimator. It can be shown by taking the difference in the outcome
variable for the EU group across time and comparing it to the difference in the comparison
group across time. In other words,
δ =
(
E[Y¯ EU1 ]− E[Y¯ EU0 ]
)
−
(
E[Y¯ C1 ]− E[Y¯ C0 ]
)
=
(
[α + β + γ + δ]− [α + β]
)
−
(
[α + γ]− α
)
=
(
γ + δ
)
−
(
γ
)
= δ
where EU denotes the EU group and C denotes the comparison group. Similarly, 1
denotes the post-reform period and 0 indicates the period prior to the reform. The
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estimator measures the effect of the ECMR reform on the EU group after controlling for a
time trend and being exposed to the reform. In the current analysis, the outcome variable
is the number of cross-border M&As flowing from the acquiring countries into the EU and
comparison groups. I aggregate the number of deals over the 2000-2003 and 2005-2008
periods, which yields a panel of two periods for 15 EU and 11 comparison countries for a
total of 52 observations. Because the outcome variable is a count I utilize the PPML
estimator.65 Rewriting equation 1 in its nonlinear form with the number of cross-border
M&As flowing into country i in time t, mit, as the outcome variable, I obtain,
E[mit|dEU , dpost] = exp(α + βdEU + γdpost + δ(dEU · dpost)) (2)
Table 4.2 presents the estimation results obtained using equation 2 for non-OECD
acquirers, which are chosen because Figure 4.2 illustrated the most interesting M&A
patterns post-reform.66 The first column of output shows no evidence of an ECMR reform
effect since the estimate of δ is not statistically significant. The effect of the reform,
however, becomes significant when including country fixed effects in the estimation.
According to column 2, the reform increased M&A activity in EU countries by 34.4%67.
Note the significance of the result is driven by a smaller standard error rather than a larger
coefficient estimate compared to the estimate in column 1. Regardless, evidence of an
ECMR reform effect appears consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 4.2.
The results described above rely on aggregated M&As for the pre- and post-reform
periods. Results based on aggregate data are unlikely to detect an ECMR refrom effect if
it occurred in a smaller window of time than a few years.68 I turn to annual data to more
65Breinlich (2008) similarly used Poisson estimation within a difference-in-difference framework to analyze
the impact of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on M&As.
66The Appendix provides estimation results for other groups of acquiring countries.
67(e(0.296) − 1) · 100 = 34.4%.
68For example, empirical analysis using EU acquirers (Figure 4.4) is unlikely to find an ECMR reform effect.
Table A3.4 confirms.
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closely examine M&A patterns around the time of the reform. The third column presents
the results for the annual data from 2000-2008 when including both time and country fixed
effects. I replace dEU · dpost in equation 2 with
∑2008
j=2005 dEU · dj to allow the effect of the
reform to vary over time. Likewise, time fixed effects replace dpost. Not surprisingly, the
results show the effect of the reform persists throughout the entire 2005-2008 period
despite gradually diminishing from 2005-2007. As stated above, proposals for ECMR
reform were published by December 2002 and the reform became certain in November
2003. Thus, the possibility of anticipatory effects prior to enforcement in May 2004 is
real. I account for potential anticipatory effects by including EU-year interaction terms for
both 2003 and 2004, and the results are given in column 4. Evidence suggests the EU
group experienced more M&A activity than the comparison group in 2003, about the
same amount in 2004, and more post-reform. One possible explanation is firms in
non-OECD countries front-loaded acquisitions of EU firms to avoid the uncertainty
associated with the new policies of the reform in 2004. Once uncertainty with the reform
was eliminated, however, firms resumed acquisition of EU targets.
The analysis thus far has neglected country characteristics in equation 2. The growing
cross-border M&A literature has shown various country-level variables are important
determinants to the location of M&A flows. Following Seldeslachts et al. (2009), I
augment equation 2 with economic and stock market variables. Specifically, I use real
GDP and the stock market-to-GDP ratio for all 26 target countries. The data come from
the Penn World Tables and the World Bank, respectively. The resulting empirical
estimates are presented in the last column of Table 4.2. As you can see, the results in
column 4 are robust to the inclusion of country characteristics.
The above results are based upon non-OECD acquirers which, as evidenced by Figures
4.1-4.4, are likely to provide the most evidence of an ECMR reform effect. There exists
much less, if any, evidence of an ECMR reform effect using the other three groups of
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acquirers. To avoid arbitrarily choosing the group of acquirers, I also estimate equation 2
for all acquiring countries, as listed in Table A3.2. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
Overall, the results suggest the reform essentially had no effect on M&A activity.
Columns 1 and 2 show no evidence of a an ECMR reform effect using aggregate data over
the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The use of annual data in columns 3-5, however,
shows some evidence of an effect in 2005. Column 3 suggests the reform increased M&A
activity in EU countries by 10.6% or, if including real GDP and stock market-to-GDP
ratio variables, 14.9%. However, the trends illustrated in Figure 4.1 are not consistent with
an economically significant effect of the ECMR reform.
Although the results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide some evidence consistent with an
ECMR reform effect for EU countries after the reform, little confidence is placed on such
a conclusion. First, Figures 4.1-4.4 shows similar pre- and post-reform patterns for the EU
and comparison groups across all groups of acquirers. The empirical results based on
non-OECD acquirers show M&A activity most consistent with an ECMR reform effect.
Thus, results from Table 4.2 likely provide an upper bound of any effect. However,
estimates in Table 4.3 indicate no significant effect when using all acquiring countries.
Second, the difference-in-difference estimator is very simple and fails to account for a
myriad of other events taking place around the time of the reform. Interpreting changes in
M&A activity as resulting directly from the ECMR reform, therefore, may be wrong.
4.4 Conclusion
Quantifying the effect of antitrust regulation on merger activity is theoretically
straightforward but is practically very difficult. Therefore, it is no surprise that the number
of studies attempting to quantify such effects is small. The current essay contributes to the
small but growing line of research by examining the effects of one piece of antitrust
regulation, the 2004 reforms to ECMR. The most notable change to ECMR was switching
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from the old dominance test to the SIEC test, in effect moving EU merger policy to more
closely resemble U.S. antitrust laws. Moreover, the new SIEC test appeared to have
increased the probability of blocking more mergers.
Results from a difference-in-difference framework provide little evidence suggesting
ECMR reforms of 2004 affected cross-border M&A activity in the EU. Rather, M&A
activity remained similar across countries in both the EU and comparison groups around
the time of the reform. The latter patterns hold for multiple groups of acquiring countries.
Finding no clear evidence of an ECMR reform effect is not surprising since the reform was
largely viewed as more of a clarification of the law rather than a change in the law itself.
The current essay adds to a small but growing literature studying the effects of merger
policy around the world. One of the biggest challenges researchers in the area must face is
how to identify the effect of antitrust policy on mergers when rising merger activity
typically precedes reforms to antitrust policy or the establishment of new antitrust
authorities altogether. In other words, merger activity often shapes antitrust policy, but
people are also interested in how antitrust policy effects merger activity. More research is
necessary to better understand how antitrust authorities control corporate marriages
affecting the prices we face daily as consumers.
Copyright c©Derrick T. Jenniges, 2014
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4.5 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Target countries
EU group (15) Comparison group (11)
Austria Italy Australia Switzerland
Belgium Luxembourg Canada Turkey
Denmark Netherlands Iceland U.S.
Finland Portugal Japan
France Spain Korea
Germany Sweden Mexico
Greece U.K. New Zealand
Ireland Norway
All target countries are OECD members. The EU group
includes EU member states in the 2000-2008 period, and
the comparison group consists of non-EU members in
the same period.
Figure 4.1: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, index (2004 =
100): all countries
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Figure 4.2: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, index (2004 =
100): non-OECD countries
Figure 4.3: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, index (2004 =
100): non-EU countries
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Figure 4.4: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, index (2004 =
100): EU countries
Figure 4.5: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, number: all
countries
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Figure 4.6: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, number:
non-OECD countries
Figure 4.7: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, number: non-EU
countries
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Table 4.2: PPML estimation results (acquirers = non-OECD countries)
Dependent variable: number of cross-border M&As
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor Aggregate Aggregate Annual Annual Annual
dEU -0.894 1.525*** 1.560*** 1.502*** 3.706***
(0.685) (0.226) (0.148) (0.161) (0.846)
dpost 0.450 0.544***
(0.759) (0.040)
dEU · dpost 0.390 0.296***
(0.949) (0.084)
dEU · d2003 0.221* 0.228*
(0.130) (0.126)
dEU · d2004 0.082 0.073
(0.136) (0.144)
dEU · d2005 0.359*** 0.418*** 0.358***
(0.094) (0.110) (0.112)
dEU · d2006 0.278*** 0.337*** 0.259**
(0.085) (0.103) (0.105)
dEU · d2007 0.195** 0.254** 0.211*
(0.094) (0.110) (0.114)
dEU · d2008 0.252** 0.311** 0.213*
(0.123) (0.136) (0.130)
Constant 3.880*** 2.464*** 1.737*** 1.737*** 2.676***
(0.540) (0.193) (0.126) (0.125) (0.556)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Country characteristics No No No No Yes
Observations 51 51 209 209 209
Log-pseudolikelihood -2,019.2 -142.2 -456.7 -455.8 -451.3
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.3: PPML estimation results (acquirers = all countries)
Dependent variable: number of cross-border M&As
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor Aggregate Aggregate Annual Annual Annual
dEU -0.064 2.686*** 2.661*** 2.654*** 2.298***
(0.516) (0.113) (0.119) (0.123) (0.386)
dpost 0.245 0.245***
(0.631) (0.019)
dEU · dpost 0.003 0.003
(0.726) (0.034)
dEU · d2003 0.027 0.042
(0.052) (0.052)
dEU · d2004 0.014 0.034
(0.050) (0.051)
dEU · d2005 0.101** 0.108** 0.139***
(0.049) (0.054) (0.053)
dEU · d2006 -0.015 -0.008 0.014
(0.050) (0.055) (0.054)
dEU · d2007 -0.040 -0.033 -0.001
(0.037) (0.043) (0.042)
dEU · d2008 -0.021 -0.014 -0.013
(0.049) (0.054) (0.052)
Constant 6.261*** 4.490*** 3.343*** 3.343*** 3.629***
(0.451) (0.098) (0.107) (0.107) (0.210)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Country characteristics No No No No Yes
Observations 52 52 231 231 231
Log-pseudolikelihood -16,365.6 -253.0 -937.9 -937.7 -933.4
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels,
respectively.
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Figure 4.8: Cross-border M&A flows into EU and comparison countries, number: EU
countries
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5 Conclusion
The three essays comprising the current dissertation study a number of features of recent
patterns in global cross-border M&As. The goal of the research was to better understand
factors affecting the locational decisions of M&As across countries. The three essays
improve our understanding of global FDI in a number of ways. First, the traditional
theories of horizontal and vertical investment have a difficult time explaining global
cross-border M&A patterns. Second, cross-border M&As in developing countries are
growing both in number and in proportion of worldwide cross-border M&A flows. Third,
contrary to previous beliefs, horizontal and vertical FDI is largely independent of country
development. More generally, the evidence suggests the differences between horizontal
and vertical investments are becoming more subtle as it appears vertical M&As take place
between firms in proximate stages of production. Lastly, reforms to antitrust policy in the
EU had no significant effect on cross-border M&As of firms in EU member states.
The first essay tests how well theories of horizontal and vertical FDI explain observed
patterns of cross-border M&As in OECD countries. Quite simply, the theories suggest
horizontal FDI should flow between similar countries separated by relatively large trade
costs while vertical FDI should flow between countries separated by low trade costs and
relatively large differences in factor endowments. I identify cross-border M&As as
horizontal and vertical using common methods in the literature and separately estimate an
empirical model based on standard FDI determinants. The results provide little support for
the traditional explanations of FDI. In general, horizontal and vertical M&As look much
more similar than expected.
The second essay challenges the common belief that the majority of FDI within the
developed world is horizontal, whereas FDI in developing nations is predominantly
vertical. In effect, the second essay questions whether the results from the first essay were
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driven by the use of OECD, and thus mostly developed, countries in the empirical
analysis. The horizontal and vertical FDI theories suggest trade costs and factor
endowments should have a stronger effect on cross-border M&As in developing countries,
stronger negative effect of trade costs and stronger positive effect of factor endowments.
Results suggest trade costs have a stronger effect on developing countries, but no clear
support is found for the idea that factor endowment drives vertical investments in
developing nations. Although the latter result does not support theory, it is both consistent
with the results of the first essay and it also appears consistent with the finding that the
proportion of horizontal and vertical investment does not depend on country development.
The results suggest vertical M&As are not driven by comparative advantage, but rather
occur between firms in proximate stages of production.
The third essay examines how ECMR reforms in 2004 affected cross-border M&As of EU
firms. One of the most notable changes associated with the reform included replacing the
old dominance test in favor of a new SIEC test, which appeared to have increased the
probability of blocking more mergers. Results from difference-in-difference estimations
provide little evidence suggesting cross-border M&A activity was effected in countries
within the EC’s jurisdiction. Rather, M&A activity in the EU remained comparable to that
outside the EU both before and after the reform.
Together, all three essays increased our understanding of cross-border M&As in a number
of ways. The first two essays studied horizontal and vertical M&A location decisions in
both developed and developing countries, while the third essay questioned how antitrust
policy affects the location of international merger activity. Future research is needed to
better understand why cross-country M&A patterns are not well-explained by the existing
theories of horizontal and vertical investment. Any potential new theories of cross-border
M&As should update and better-describe the locational decisions of different types of
investment we have seen in the recent past. Furthermore, the third essay highlights the
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difficulty with identifying the effects on antitrust on corporate merger activity. Given the
level of M&A activity around the world, challenges associated with understanding how to
influence global corporate takeovers on a large scale are mounting.
Copyright c©Derrick T. Jenniges, 2014
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A Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A1.1: Two-digit SIC manufacturing industries
20 Food and kindred products
21 Tobacco products
22 Textile mill products
23 Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials
24 Lumber and wood products, except furniture
25 Furniture and fixtures
26 Paper and allied products
27 Printing, publishing, and allied industries
28 Chemicals and allied products
29 Petroleum refining and related industries
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
31 Leather and leather products
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products
33 Primary metal industries
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment
37 Transportation equipment
38 Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical goods;
watches and clocks
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
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Table A1.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Definition Source
M&As The number of mergers and
acquisitions for each
country-industry pair in a given
year.
Thomson Financial Securities
Industry GDP Manufacturing sector value added
(volumes) of the acquiring (target)
country. Data are converted to
USD using IFS exchange rates
(period average).
OECD STAN database (ISIC Rev.
3)
Distance Distance (in kilometers) between
the two most populous cities in the
acquiring and target countries.
Center for Prospective Studies on
International Information (CEPII)
Remoteness Distance of acquiring (target)
country from all other countries
weighted by those other countries’
share of world GDP
(=
∑
k 6=l
Yk
YWorld
·Distancekl).
CEPII; Penn World Tables
Urban concentration Percent of the country’s population
that resides in urban areas.
World Bank’s World Development
Indicators
Skill level Percent of employment holding
skilled labor positions in the
acquiring (target) country. Skilled
labor is defined as categories 1,2,
and 3 for ISCO-88 and 0/1 and 2
for ISCO-1968. ISCO-88 was
used in cases where both ISCO-88
and ISCO-1968 numbers were
reported.
International Labor Organization’s
Database of Labor Statistics
(LABORSTA)
Squared skill difference Squared difference in the percent
of employment holding skilled
labor positions between the
acquiring and target countries.
LABORSTA
Squared education difference Squared difference in the average
years of total education for the
population aged 15 and over
between the acquiring and target
countries.
Barro-Lee Educational Attainment
Dataset
Common language A dummy variable indicating the
acquiring and target countries
share a common official language.
CEPII
Colony A dummy variable indicating the
acquiring and target countries have
had (or do have) a colonial link.
CEPII
Regional trade agreement A dummy variable indicating the
acquiring and target countries are
in a regional trade agreement,
custom union, or economic
integration agreement.
World Trade Organization
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Table A1.3: Country list
Country (year of OECD membership)
Australia (1971) Hungary (1996) Norway (1961)
Austria (1961) Iceland (1961) Poland (1996)
Belgium (1961) Ireland (1961) Portugal (1961)
Canada (1961) Italy (1962) Spain (1961)
Czech Republic (1995) Japan (1964) Sweden (1961)
Denmark (1961) Korea (1996) Switzerland (1961)
Finland (1969) Luxembourg (1961) Turkey (1961)
France (1961) Mexico (1994) United Kingdom (1961)
Germany (1961) Netherlands (1961) United States (1961)
Greece (1961) New Zealand (1973)
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org). Slovak Republic (2000) is excluded
since the empirical analysis begins in 1999.
Table A1.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Yik(jl) (millions USD) 10,016.15 22,597.36 2.86 225,577.53
Distancekl (kilometers) 4,070.55 3,763.91 173.03 19,586.18
Remotek(l) 5,570.87 1,009.58 4,932.75 13,144.03
Urbank(l) 0.76 0.1 0.54 0.97
Skillk(l) 0.36 0.08 0.16 0.48
D.Skill2kl 0.01 0.02 0 0.09
D.Education2kl 3.19 3.93 0 29.4
CommonLanguagekl 0.08 0.27 0 1
Colonykl 0.04 0.19 0 1
RTAkl 0.69 0.46 0 1
N = 1,336,240
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Table A1.5: Correlation Matrix
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) 1.00
(2) -0.02 1.00
(3) 0.15 0.15 1.00
(4) 0.17 -0.01 0.61 1.00
(5) -0.01 0.17 0.61 -0.03 1.00
(6) 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
(7) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
(8) -0.14 0.02 -0.44 -0.69 0.02 0.34 0.01 1.00
(9) 0.02 -0.14 -0.44 0.02 -0.69 0.01 0.34 0.00 1.00
(10) 0.04 0.04 0.57 0.36 0.36 -0.03 -0.03 -0.37 -0.37 1.00
(11) 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.16 -0.10 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.06 1.00
(12) 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 -0.15 -0.05 1.00
(13) 0.06 0.06 -0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 0.12 0.33 1.00
(14) -0.25 -0.25 -0.69 -0.35 -0.35 -0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.25 -0.29 -0.12 0.03 -0.09 1.00
Where 1-14 denote: Yik (1), Yjl (2), Distancekl (3), Remotek (4), Remotel (5), Urbank (6), Urbanl (7), Skillk (8), Skilll (9), D.Skill2kl (10),
D.Education2kl (11), CommonLanguagekl (12), Colonykl (13), RTAkl (14).
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Table A1.6: PPML estimation results (primary SIC)
All M&As Horizontal Vertical† Non-horizontal
lnYik 0.719*** 0.706*** 0.781*** 0.733***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.043) (0.035)
lnYjl 0.686*** 0.650*** 0.743*** 0.716***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.035)
lnDistancekl -0.255*** -0.300*** -0.280*** -0.226***
(0.073) (0.082) (0.086) (0.075)
lnRemotek 1.926*** 2.085*** 1.757** 1.819***
(0.552) (0.598) (0.728) (0.565)
lnRemotel 1.074 1.031 1.538*** 1.122
(0.704) (0.727) (0.566) (0.720)
lnUrbank 0.481 0.549 0.221 0.417
(0.404) (0.416) (0.591) (0.453)
lnUrbanl 0.998** 1.066** 1.057** 0.934**
(0.432) (0.464) (0.521) (0.447)
lnSkillk 2.751*** 2.748*** 2.505*** 2.773***
(0.340) (0.343) (0.446) (0.362)
lnSkilll 1.874*** 1.487*** 1.870*** 2.170***
(0.325) (0.362) (0.315) (0.327)
lnD.Skill2kl 0.055*** 0.052** 0.059** 0.057***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021)
lnD.Education2kl 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.051 0.066***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.035) (0.021)
CommonLanguagekl 0.561*** 0.569*** 0.450*** 0.542***
(0.121) (0.118) (0.128) (0.129)
Colonykl 0.520*** 0.559*** 0.528*** 0.527***
(0.166) (0.167) (0.177) (0.176)
RTAkl 0.225 0.243 0.274 0.201
(0.151) (0.170) (0.200) (0.159)
Constant -58.737*** -54.843*** -82.350*** -59.388***
(8.136) (8.888) (8.255) (8.281)
Log-pseudolikelihood -26,533.6 -6,841.2 -4,913.7 -17,403.7
Observations 1,336,240 71,114 1,336,240 1,336,240
Estimations include both acquirer and target industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC level) as well as time
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are
denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively. Bold coefficients
in the vertical and non-horizontal columns denote the coefficients are statistically different (five percent
significance level) from the corresponding coefficients in the horizontal column.
† Data sparsity prevents statistical comparison between coefficients for vertical and horizontal M&As.
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Table A1.7: PPML estimation results (primary and secondary SIC – with overlap)
All Horizontal Vertical Non-horizontal
lnYik 0.719*** 0.715*** 0.749*** 0.724***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
lnYjl 0.686*** 0.676*** 0.723*** 0.702***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
lnDistancekl -0.255*** -0.270*** -0.245*** -0.243***
(0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.073)
lnRemotek 1.926*** 1.867*** 2.123*** 2.007***
(0.552) (0.567) (0.531) (0.544)
lnRemotel 1.074 0.996 1.423** 1.100
(0.704) (0.714) (0.646) (0.712)
lnUrbank 0.481 0.479 0.746* 0.445
(0.404) (0.391) (0.412) (0.410)
lnUrbanl 0.998** 1.103** 1.085** 1.012**
(0.432) (0.434) (0.443) (0.432)
lnSkillk 2.751*** 2.686*** 2.901*** 2.842***
(0.340) (0.339) (0.372) (0.344)
lnSkilll 1.874*** 1.624*** 2.097*** 1.994***
(0.325) (0.332) (0.311) (0.322)
lnD.Skill2kl 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.078*** 0.059***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
lnD.Education2kl 0.066*** 0.049** 0.069*** 0.065***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
CommonLanguagekl 0.561*** 0.531*** 0.466*** 0.550***
(0.121) (0.124) (0.123) (0.119)
Colonykl 0.520*** 0.516*** 0.508*** 0.509***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.164)
RTAkl 0.225 0.252* 0.233 0.219
(0.151) (0.151) (0.159) (0.152)
Constant -58.737*** -58.010*** -65.194*** -60.196***
(8.136) (8.418) (7.557) (8.199)
Log-pseudolikelihood -26,533.6 -19,401.8 -18,213.8 -25,219.9
Observations 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240 1,336,240
Estimations include both acquirer and target industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC level) as well as time
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are
denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively. Bold coefficients
in the vertical and non-horizontal columns denote the coefficients are statistically different (five percent
significance level) from the corresponding coefficients in the horizontal column.
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A.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard
Devia-
tion
Minimum Maximum N
Yk(l) (billions of 2005 international dollars) 649.08 1,576.54 1.82 13,187.36 63,682
yk(l) (2005 international dollars) 18,478.28 16,654.76 158.72 149,950.17 63,682
Distancekl (kilometers) 7,813.32 4,715.64 59.62 19,772.34 63,682
ρl 95.72 51.97 20.79 275.42 63,682
Contiguouskl 0.03 0.17 0 1 63,682
CommonLanguagekl 0.12 0.33 0 1 63,682
Colonykl 0.02 0.15 0 1 63,682
BTTkl 0.35 0.48 0 1 63,682
RTAkl 0.27 0.45 0 1 63,682
Educationk(l) 8.95 2.03 3.56 13.02 63,682
TaxRatek(l) 29.82 7.74 10 55 63,682
PhoneLinesk(l) 29.75 19.98 0.33 74.76 63,682
StockMktk(l) 44.61 70.92 0.00 755.06 63,682
Wagek(l) 9.50 7.11 0.70 30.83 23,046
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Table A2.2: Variable descriptions
Variable Definition Source
Real GDP GDP in trillions of 2005
international dollars.
Penn World Tables
Real GDP per capita GDP per person in 2005
international dollars.
Penn World Tables
Distance Distance (in kilometers) between the
two most populous cities in the
acquiring and target countries.
Center for Prospective Studies on
International Information (CEPII)
(Paris, France)
ρl Multilateral index of trade costs
(=
∑
k 6=l
Distancekl
Yk
).
Penn World Tables, CEPII
Tax rate Highest marginal corporate income
tax rate.
KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax
Rate Survey 2009
Phone lines Number of telephone lines per 100
people.
World Bank (World Development
Indicators)
Stock market Stock market-to-GDP ratio (total
value of stocks traded-to-GDP ratio).
World Bank (World Development
Indicators)
Education Average years of total education for
the population aged 15 and over,
where total education includes
primary, secondary, and tertiary
education.
Barro-Lee Educational Attainment
Dataset
Common language A dummy variable indicating that
the acquiring and target countries
share a common official language.
CEPII
Colony A dummy variable indicating that
the acquiring and target countries
have had (or do have) a colonial link.
CEPII
Contiguous A dummy variable indicating that
the acquiring and target countries
share a geographical border.
CEPII
Bilateral tax treaty A dummy variable indicating that
the acquiring and target countries
have signed a bilateral tax treaty.
UNCTAD
Regional trade agreement A dummy variable indicating that
the acquiring and target countries
are in a regional trade agreement,
custom union, or economic
integration agreement.
World Trade Organization
Wage Effective gross hourly wage (in
USD) in 15 professions, taking into
account working hours, paid
vacation and legal holidays;
weighting according to distribution
of professions. Wage data are
city-specific, but I use these for
countries as a whole. Averages are
taken when multiple cities are
surveyed in the same country.
Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS)
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Table A2.3: Coefficient sum tests
All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
lnWagel -0.186 -0.364 -0.027
δ · lnWagel 0.272 0.371 0.046
sum 0.086 0.007 0.019
lnEducationl 0.199 -0.154 0.350
δ · lnEducationl -0.729 -0.065 -1.443
sum -0.530* -0.219 -1.093**
lnTaxRatel -0.511 -0.656 -0.468
δ · lnTaxRatel 0.459 0.544 0.647
sum -0.052 -0.112 0.179
lnPhoneLinesl 0.947 0.886 1.130
δ · lnPhoneLinesl -0.563 -0.519 -0.483
sum 0.384** 0.367** 0.647***
lnStockMktl 0.143 0.124 0.153
δ · lnStockMktl -0.151 -0.156 -0.154
sum -0.008 -0.032 -0.001
Wald tests examine the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates sum to zero.
Coefficient sums significantly different from zero are denoted by ***, **, * at
the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table A2.4: Country list
Developed (36):
Australia Estonia Japan Portugal
Austria Finland Latvia Romania
Belgium France Lithuania Slovak Republic
Bermuda Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Bulgaria Greece Malta Spain
Canada Hungary Netherlands Sweden
Cyprus Iceland New Zealand Switzerland
Czech Republic Ireland Norway U.K.
Denmark Italy Poland U.S.
Transition (14):
Albania Croatia Moldova
Armenia Georgia Russian Federation
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Ukraine
Belarus Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Macedonia
Developing (87):
Algeria Egypt Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Argentina El Salvador Mauritius Senegal
Bahamas Fiji Mexico Sierra Leone
Bahrain Gabon Mongolia Singapore
Bangladesh Ghana Morocco Solomon Islands
Barbados Guatemala Mozambique South Africa
Belize Guyana Namibia Sri Lanka
Bolivia Honduras Nepal Swaziland
Botswana Hong Kong Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic
Brazil India Niger Taiwan
Brunei Darussalam Indonesia Nigeria Tanzania
Cambodia Iran Oman Thailand
Cameroon Israel Pakistan Togo
Cape Verde Jamaica Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Chad Jordan Papua New Guinea Tunisia
Chile Kenya Paraguay Turkey
China Kuwait Peru United Arab Emirates
Colombia Laos Philippines Uruguay
Costa Rica Lebanon Puerto Rico Venezuela
Cuba Libya Qatar Viet Nam
Dominican Republic Macau Republic of Korea Zambia
Ecuador Madagascar Rwanda Zimbabwe
Source: United Nations (2012). Note that the use of “developing" countries throughout the paper includes
both transition and developing countries. Countries denote those included in the empirical analyses.
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Table A2.5: PPML estimation results: trade costs (all M&As)
Pooled D-D D-d d-D d-d
lnDistancekl -0.444*** -0.447*** -0.606*** -0.473*** -0.994***
(0.052) (0.067) (0.142) (0.107) (0.084)
lnρl 0.231** 0.035 1.576*** -0.345** 2.316***
(0.112) (0.119) (0.228) (0.174) (0.335)
Contiguouskl 0.099 0.035 0.488 0.634** 0.068
(0.118) (0.143) (0.307) (0.315) (0.260)
CommonLanguagekl 0.824*** 0.595*** 0.833*** 1.821*** 1.280***
(0.105) (0.119) (0.201) (0.252) (0.257)
Colonykl 0.425*** 0.529*** 0.083 -0.050 0.756
(0.118) (0.143) (0.307) (0.315) (0.260)
BTTkl 0.082 -0.122 0.332** 0.187 0.417*
(0.081) (0.105) (0.136) (0.168) (0.227)
RTAkl 0.287*** 0.098 0.434*** 0.509** 0.395**
(0.098) (0.144) (0.155) (0.207) (0.199)
lnYk 0.653*** 0.573*** 0.684*** 0.884*** 0.574***
(0.041) (0.050) (0.061) (0.078) (0.090)
lnYl 0.724*** 0.691*** 0.759*** 0.817*** 0.559***
(0.039) (0.055) (0.041) (0.088) (0.066)
lnyk 0.675*** 1.222*** 0.740*** 0.662*** 0.463***
(0.107) (0.203) (0.280) (0.129) (0.147)
lnyl -0.260** -0.230 -0.181 -0.835* -0.497***
(0.106) (0.194) (0.114) (0.470) (0.140)
lnEducationk 0.197 0.411 -0.345 -0.289 -0.043
(0.295) (0.433) (0.457) (0.394) (0.583)
lnEducationl 0.051 0.805** -0.096 1.201 -0.045
(0.253) (0.345) (0.286) (0.927) (0.423)
lnTaxRatek -0.235 -0.139 -0.164 -0.027 -1.055***
(0.165) (0.206) (0.262) (0.306) (0.290)
lnTaxRatel -0.423*** -0.507*** -0.387* -0.439 -0.591
(0.147) (0.196) (0.228) (0.315) (0.404)
lnPhoneLinesk -0.056 0.935*** 1.081*** -0.191 -0.093
(0.140) (0.262) (0.342) (0.177) (0.186)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.565*** 0.713** 0.717*** 0.845 0.821***
(0.115) (0.295) (0.140) (0.628) (0.161)
lnStockMktk 0.314*** 0.237*** 0.213*** 0.269*** 0.292***
(0.042) (0.052) (0.074) (0.059) (0.048)
lnStockMktl 0.096*** 0.147*** 0.098*** 0.144 0.035
(0.029) (0.047) (0.034) (0.109) (0.057)
Constant -5.106*** -15.633*** -14.097*** 0.460 -2.814
(1.302) (2.384) (3.202) (3.695) (2.996)
Developedk 0.494***
(0.130)
Developedl 0.476***
(0.108)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 63,682 10,166 15,481 15,481 22,554
Estimations include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients
are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table A2.6: PPML estimation results: trade costs (horizontal M&As)
Pooled D-D D-d d-D d-d
lnDistancekl -0.494*** -0.492*** -0.662*** -0.470*** -0.929***
(0.059) (0.088) (0.154) (0.175) (0.099)
lnρl 0.132 -0.003 1.212*** -0.498 1.900***
(0.113) (0.127) (0.293) (0.309) (0.489)
Contiguouskl 0.215 0.196 0.647** -0.605 0.287
(0.137) (0.153) (0.326) (0.621) (0.310)
CommonLanguagekl 0.721*** 0.567*** 0.816*** 1.354*** 0.998***
(0.123) (0.143) (0.252) (0.332) (0.297)
Colonykl 0.554*** 0.610*** -0.227 0.395 1.543***
(0.148) (0.163) (0.274) (0.402) (0.558)
BTTkl 0.067 -0.162 0.608*** 0.267 0.257
(0.092) (0.120) (0.210) (0.233) (0.228)
RTAkl 0.230* 0.048 0.367** 0.328 0.385
(0.125) (0.208) (0.183) (0.263) (0.263)
lnYk 0.664*** 0.623*** 0.599*** 0.865*** 0.487***
(0.045) (0.057) (0.092) (0.120) (0.172)
lnYl 0.735*** 0.724*** 0.709*** 0.784*** 0.616***
(0.045) (0.060) (0.069) (0.158) (0.100)
lnyk 0.755*** 1.322*** 1.042** 0.526** 0.456
(0.126) (0.254) (0.473) (0.208) (0.291)
lnyl -0.394*** -0.411 -0.254 -1.373* -0.444**
(0.131) (0.254) (0.159) (0.798) (0.213)
lnEducationk -0.432 -0.469 -1.454** -0.661 -0.341
(0.332) (0.470) (0.705) (0.557) (0.747)
lnEducationl 0.059 0.419 0.026 1.442 -0.030
(0.307) (0.434) (0.427) (1.424) (0.811)
lnTaxRatek -0.167 -0.118 0.267 0.131 -1.143**
(0.194) (0.235) (0.485) (0.393) (0.492)
lnTaxRatel -0.678*** -0.788*** -0.332 -0.332 -1.191**
(0.173) (0.221) (0.328) (0.527) (0.581)
lnPhoneLinesk 0.266 0.930*** 0.596 0.097 0.254
(0.181) (0.343) (0.525) (0.259) (0.285)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.602*** 0.482 0.776*** 0.872 0.564**
(0.130) (0.346) (0.173) (0.910) (0.276)
lnStockMktk 0.202*** 0.139** 0.224** 0.207** 0.221**
(0.050) (0.063) (0.108) (0.094) (0.101)
lnStockMktl 0.060 0.125* 0.035 0.258 0.074
(0.037) (0.064) (0.059) (0.199) (0.080)
Constant -4.053*** -10.536*** -13.827*** 4.357 -1.019
(1.556) (3.139) (5.021) (6.095) (4.660)
Developedk 0.413***
(0.152)
Developedl 0.596***
(0.138)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 63,682 10,166 15,481 15,481 22,554
Estimations include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients
are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table A2.7: PPML estimation results: trade costs (vertical M&As)
Pooled D-D D-d d-D d-d
lnDistancekl -0.405*** -0.457*** -0.581*** -0.318* -1.022***
(0.069) (0.084) (0.186) (0.183) (0.175)
lnρl 0.249* 0.036 2.163*** -0.207 2.577***
(0.138) (0.139) (0.325) (0.295) (0.399)
Contiguouskl 0.014 -0.134 0.406 0.961** -0.341
(0.159) (0.178) (0.436) (0.442) (0.373)
CommonLanguagekl 0.855*** 0.669*** 0.750** 1.586*** 1.374***
(0.115) (0.122) (0.293) (0.330) (0.315)
Colonykl 0.397*** 0.473*** 0.154 0.321 -13.434***
(0.150) (0.165) (0.345) (0.388) (0.541)
BTTkl 0.117 -0.108 0.522** 0.634*** 0.314
(0.115) (0.122) (0.224) (0.228) (0.346)
RTAkl 0.232* -0.020 0.312 0.553* 0.853**
(0.131) (0.176) (0.266) (0.313) (0.368)
lnYk 0.706*** 0.651*** 0.678*** 0.750*** 0.436***
(0.057) (0.070) (0.126) (0.115) (0.156)
lnYl 0.772*** 0.726*** 0.878*** 0.662*** 0.638***
(0.051) (0.070) (0.084) (0.125) (0.140)
lnyk 0.749*** 1.051*** 0.536 0.840*** 0.307
(0.148) (0.273) (0.603) (0.245) (0.217)
lnyl -0.135 -0.030 0.152 -1.514* -0.385
(0.142) (0.262) (0.185) (0.782) (0.299)
lnEducationk 0.267 0.620 -0.212 -0.612 -0.851
(0.379) (0.549) (0.837) (0.626) (0.973)
lnEducationl -0.156 0.868** -0.708 3.263** 0.085
(0.338) (0.414) (0.525) (1.500) (0.995)
lnTaxRatek -0.425* -0.467 0.034 -0.330 -1.103**
(0.252) (0.306) (0.628) (0.454) (0.497)
lnTaxRatel -0.343* -0.439* -0.378 -0.286 -0.499
(0.176) (0.243) (0.349) (0.489) (0.485)
lnPhoneLinesk -0.018 0.907*** 1.681*** -0.107 0.214
(0.178) (0.326) (0.610) (0.300) (0.348)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.667*** 1.022** 0.860*** 1.266 0.794**
(0.162) (0.401) (0.212) (1.115) (0.388)
lnStockMktk 0.354*** 0.291*** 0.341** 0.356*** 0.284***
(0.062) (0.080) (0.167) (0.100) (0.077)
lnStockMktl 0.090** 0.127* 0.141** 0.207 -0.019
(0.045) (0.071) (0.066) (0.174) (0.091)
Constant -9.272*** -18.629*** -23.243*** -4.612 -4.772
(1.706) (3.148) (6.871) (5.320) (4.302)
Developedk 0.474***
(0.168)
Developedl 0.388***
(0.138)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 63,682 10,166 15,481 15,481 22,554
Estimations include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses. Significant coefficients
are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table A2.8: PPML estimation results: factor endowments
All M&As All M&As Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As
lnyk 0.675*** 0.674*** 0.755*** 0.746***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.125) (0.148)
lnyl -0.260** -0.314 -0.539** -0.121
(0.106) (0.197) (0.252) (0.270)
δ · lnyl 0.091 0.235 0.026
(0.239) (0.302) (0.317)
lnEducationk 0.197 0.206 -0.456 0.314
(0.295) (0.296) (0.331) (0.374)
lnEducationl 0.051 0.244 0.059 0.289
(0.253) (0.376) (0.439) (0.435)
δ · lnEducationl -0.342 0.053 -0.906
(0.460) (0.570) (0.627)
lnTaxRatek -0.235 -0.247 -0.180 -0.439*
(0.165) (0.165) (0.193) (0.250)
lnTaxRatel -0.423*** -0.587*** -0.778*** -0.612***
(0.147) (0.181) (0.200) (0.222)
δ · lnTaxRatel 0.429* 0.506 0.662**
(0.250) (0.318) (0.329)
lnPhoneLinesk -0.056 -0.052 0.269 -0.012
(0.140) (0.139) (0.179) (0.177)
lnPhoneLinesl 0.565*** 0.791*** 0.569* 1.104***
(0.115) (0.298) (0.336) (0.412)
δ · lnPhoneLinesl -0.225 0.016 -0.393
(0.321) (0.372) (0.449)
lnStockMktk 0.314*** 0.316*** 0.204*** 0.359***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.061)
lnStockMktl 0.096*** 0.121*** 0.117** 0.094
(0.029) (0.043) (0.058) (0.066)
δ · lnStockMktl -0.074 -0.102 -0.060
(0.047) (0.064) (0.067)
lnYk 0.653*** 0.653*** 0.666*** 0.705***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.045) (0.056)
lnYl 0.724*** 0.724*** 0.743*** 0.768***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051)
lnDistancekl -0.444*** -0.439*** -0.493*** -0.394***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.059) (0.067)
lnρl 0.231** 0.208* 0.108 0.211
(0.112) (0.108) (0.113) (0.131)
Contiguouskl 0.099 0.100 0.227* 0.008
(0.118) (0.118) (0.135) (0.160)
CommonLanguagekl 0.824*** 0.799*** 0.736*** 0.798***
(0.105) (0.111) (0.128) (0.116)
Colonykl 0.425*** 0.417*** 0.521*** 0.410***
(0.137) (0.134) (0.146) (0.146)
BTTkl 0.082 0.085 0.071 0.116
(0.081) (0.086) (0.098) (0.117)
RTAkl 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.217* 0.258**
(0.098) (0.096) (0.122) (0.129)
Constant -5.106*** -5.801*** -5.966*** -9.928***
(1.302) (1.424) (1.824) (1.842)
Log-pseudolikelihood
Observations 63,682 63,682 63,682 63,682
Estimations include time and developed country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses.
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels, respectively.
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Table A3.1: OECD and EU country lists
OECD Countries (year of OECD membership)
Australia (1971) Hungary (1996) Poland (1996)
Austria (1961) Iceland (1961) Portugal (1961)
Belgium (1961) Ireland (1961) Slovak Republic (2000)
Canada (1961) Israel (2010) Slovenia (2010)
Chile (2010) Italy (1962) Spain (1961)
Czech Republic (1995) Japan (1964) Sweden (1961)
Denmark (1961) Korea (1996) Switzerland (1961)
Estonia (2010) Luxembourg (1961) Turkey (1961)
Finland (1969) Mexico (1994) United Kingdom (1961)
France (1961) Netherlands (1961) United States (1961)
Germany (1961) New Zealand (1973)
Greece (1961) Norway (1961)
EU Countries (year of EU membership)
Austria (1995) Germany (1952) Poland (2004)
Belgium (1952) Greece (1981) Portugal (1986)
Bulgaria (2007) Hungary (2004) Romania (2007)
Croatia (2013) Ireland (1973) Slovak Republic (2004)
Cyprus (2004) Italy (1952) Slovenia (2004)
Czech Republic (2004) Latvia (2004) Spain (1986)
Denmark (1973) Lithuania (2004) Sweden (1995)
Estonia (2004) Luxembourg (1952) United Kingdom (1973)
Finland (1995) Malta (2004)
France (1952) Netherlands (1952)
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org) and EU (www.europa.eu), respectively.
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Table A3.2: Acquiring country list∗
All countries (55)
Argentina China Iceland Luxembourg Saudi Arabia
Australia Croatia India Malaysia Singapore
Austria Cyprus Ireland Mexico Slovenia
Bahamas Denmark Isle of Man Netherlands South Africa
Bahrain Finland Israel Netherlands Antilles Spain
Belgium France Italy New Zealand Sweden
Bermuda Germany Japan Norway Switzerland
Brazil Greece Jersey Panama Taiwan
British Virgin Islands Guernsey Korea Poland Turkey
Canada Hong Kong Kuwait Portugal U.K.
Cayman Islands Hungary Liechtenstein Russia U.S.
Non-OECD countries (27)
Argentina Cayman Islands India Malaysia Slovenia†
Bahamas China Isle of Man Netherlands Antilles South Africa
Bahrain Croatia Israel† Panama Taiwan
Bermuda Cyprus Jersey Russia
Brazil Guernsey Kuwait Saudi Arabia
British Virgin Islands Hong Kong Liechtenstein Singapore
Non-EU countries (36)
Argentina Cayman Islands Israel Netherlands Antilles Switzerland
Australia China Japan New Zealand Taiwan
Bahamas Croatia‡ Jersey Norway Turkey
Bahrain Guernsey Korea Panama U.S.
Bermuda Hong Kong Kuwait Russia
Brazil Iceland Liechtenstein Saudi Arabia
British Virgin Islands India Malaysia Singapore
Canada Isle of Man Mexico South Africa
EU countries (15)
Austria Finland Greece Luxembourg Spain
Belgium France Ireland Netherlands Sweden
Denmark Germany Italy Portugal U.K.
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org) and EU (www.europa.eu), respectively.
∗ Acquiring countries include those with M&A activity in at least one country of both the EU
and comparison groups (see Table 1) in at least one year of both the pre-reform (2000-2003) and
post-reform (2005-2008) periods.
† Israel and Slovenia are included because they became OECD members in 2010, which is after
the time period studied in the empirical analysis (2000-2008).
‡ Croatia is included because it became an EU member in 2013, which is after the time period
studied in the empirical analysis (2000-2008).
111
Table A3.3: PPML estimation results (acquirers = non-EU countries)
Dependent variable: number of cross-border M&As
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor Aggregate Aggregate Annual Annual Annual
dEU -0.439 2.165*** 2.160*** 2.127*** 1.926***
(0.557) (0.111) (0.130) (0.136) (0.486)
dpost 0.341 0.341***
(0.602) (0.018)
dEU · dpost 0.061 0.061**
(0.791) (0.028)
dEU · d2003 0.034 0.059
(0.078) (0.076)
dEU · d2004 0.131** 0.163***
(0.058) (0.058)
dEU · d2005 0.126* 0.159** 0.200***
(0.070) (0.076) (0.069)
dEU · d2006 -0.001 0.033 0.054
(0.053) (0.062) (0.060)
dEU · d2007 -0.040 -0.006 0.043
(0.047) (0.057) (0.059)
dEU · d2008 0.080 0.114* 0.105*
(0.049) (0.058) (0.055)
Constant 5.695*** 4.119*** 3.006*** 3.006*** 3.632***
(0.420) (0.102) (0.115) (0.116) (0.266)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Country characteristics No No No No Yes
Observations 52 52 229 229 229
Log-pseudolikelihood -10,716.2 -197.8 -779.9 -777.3 -772.4
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels,
respectively.
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Table A3.4: PPML estimation results (acquirers = EU countries)
Dependent variable: number of cross-border M&As
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor Aggregate Aggregate Annual Annual Annual
dEU 0.277 3.370*** 3.361*** 3.335*** 3.164***
(0.562) (0.141) (0.144) (0.149) (0.418)
dpost 0.096 0.096***
(0.722) (0.034)
dEU · dpost 0.033 0.033
(0.773) (0.048)
dEU · d2003 0.137** 0.147***
(0.057) (0.057)
dEU · d2004 0.042 0.054
(0.068) (0.069)
dEU · d2005 0.161*** 0.187*** 0.206***
(0.062) (0.068) (0.072)
dEU · d2006 0.062 0.088 0.100
(0.067) (0.072) (0.072)
dEU · d2007 0.020 0.046 0.064
(0.053) (0.060) (0.059)
dEU · d2008 -0.098 -0.072 -0.078
(0.074) (0.080) (0.081)
Constant 5.421*** 3.265*** 2.051*** 2.051*** 2.294***
(0.527) (0.126) (0.138) (0.139) (0.272)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Country characteristics No No No No Yes
Observations 52 52 229 229 229
Log-pseudolikelihood -7,298.7 -223.4 -795.9 -793.8 -792.5
Significant coefficients are denoted by ***, **, * at the one, five, and ten percent significant levels,
respectively.
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